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This thesis is an attempt to contribute to the understanding of the landscape of artificial 
intelligence, human cognition, and cognitive liberty, set in the context of contemporary life. I 
am exploring if there is a need to rethink the protection of human cognition, provided by the 
international human rights framework and if that framework is elastic enough to be able to 
provide sufficient protection of human cognition in the contemporary context of AI influencing 
human life. 
I suggest that turning to a posthuman understanding of the world can provide new terminologies 
and new understandings that can be helpful in understanding new human living conditions in 
which AI constitutes integrate parts. I am, therefore, in light of a posthuman understanding of 
the world, analysing how relevant kinds of AI are affecting human cognition. A posthuman 
understanding of the world could lead to an understanding that posthuman rights are necessary. 
I do, however, suggest that the concept of human rights can have a desirable function in human 
society and am therefore not proposing posthuman rights. My suggestion is rather, that human 
rights, can be rethought in light of a posthuman understanding of how AI affects human 
cognition. Based on these explorations and analyses I suggest that the relevant kinds of AI are 
affecting human cognition in new ways that alter common human vulnerability and makes 
human cognition vulnerable. Since protection of human cognition, as a common human interest 
that is vulnerable and necessary for humans to be agents, can be argued to be a common human 
interest that should be protected by human rights, the introduction of AI entails a need for 
rethinking protection of human cognition in the contemporary context of AI influencing human 
life. I am, therefore, analysing the concept of cognitive liberty in the contemporary context of 
AI influencing human life to understand if the international human rights framework is elastic 
enough to adapt already recognized rights so that they can protect human cognition in this 
contemporary context, and if cognitive liberty, as a new human right, can be justified. I am 
arguing that already recognized rights cannot, in line with rules of interpretation, be interpreted 
so that they can accommodate such protection and, thus, that the international human rights 
framework is not elastic enough to adapt already recognized rights to the contemporary context 
of AI influencing human life. I am, further, suggesting that a new human right guaranteeing 
protection of human cognitive liberty ought to be considered by the international community. 
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“We shape our tools, and thereafter our tools shape us.”1 
1.1 Problem and purpose  
This thesis is an attempt to contribute to the understanding of the landscape of artificial 
intelligence, human cognition, and cognitive liberty, set in the context of contemporary life. I 
am exploring if there is a need to rethink the protection of human cognition, provided by the 
international human rights framework and if that framework is elastic enough to be able to 
provide sufficient protection of human cognition in the contemporary context of artificial 
intelligence (AI) influencing human life. In this context, technological advancement is moving 
at a very high pace and human society is changing character for every day that passes. A new 
phenomenon called Artificial Intelligence has been developed.2 Technological advancement 
has now reached a stage where AI has surpassed human intelligence, even if that is the case 
only when performing narrow tasks.3 AI can learn through machine learning, a new technique 
through which systems are learning automatically when being presented with large amounts of 
data.4 
AI entails substantial benefits to human society, but it also poses certain risks and may have 
negative impacts on, for example, democracy, the rule of law and the human being, itself.5 AI 
is being used in countless different ways and is affecting human life to a large extent. Self-
 
1 Culkin, J.M., “A schoolman’s guide to Marshall McLuhan.” Saturday Review, (1967) pp. 51-53, p. 71-72. 
2 The development of Artificial intelligence can be considered to have started with the first work that today is 
generally recognized as artificial intelligence, done by Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts in 1943. (Russell, 
Stuart J, Norvig, Peter & Davis, Ernest, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, Global Edition (Pearson 
Education M.U.A., 2016) [Electronic] Available: Dawsonera, https://www-dawsonera-
com.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/readonline/9781292153971 (Last accessed: 1/12-2019)) Based on this recognition, 
artificial intelligence has been around for 76 years. In relation to the history of human beings, AI can therefore 
be considered to be a new phenomenon.  
3 See. Chen, Jim X., “The Evolution of Computing: AlphaGo.” Computing in Science & Engineering, vol. 18, 
no. 4, 2016, pp. 4–7 & Lu, Huimin, Yujie Li, Min Chen, Hyoungseop Kim, and Seiichi Serikawa, “Brain 
Intelligence: Go Beyond Artificial Intelligence.” ArXiv.org, 2017, arXiv.org. & Hayles, N. Katherine, 
“Computing the Human.” Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 22, no. 1, 2005, pp. 131-151, p. 132.  
4 Lexico powered by oxford, “Machine learning”, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/machine_learning (Last 
accessed: 18-10-2019). 
5 The EC High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, AI HLEG, 2019, “Ethics Guidance for 
Trustworthy AI”, https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/ai-alliance-consultation (Last accessed: 11/12-2019), p. 2. 
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driving cars are rapidly becoming reality,6 and human bodies can communicate with chatbots.7 
Developing “artificial intelligence information communication technology”,8 has been one of 
the focuses of the technological development of AI. AI is, thus, now even shaping the flow of 
information, which is reaching human beings.  
AI in personalization algorithms is filtering and thereby customizing the information flow, for 
every specific human being, creating what has been called filter bubbles.9 AI in Augmented 
reality technology is overlying virtual content over what is being perceived in the non-virtual 
world.10 Neurodevices such as consumer-based headsets, analysing brainwaves, are reading 
human cognition and might soon be replacing the keyboard, the touch screen, the mouse and 
voice command as preferred ways for human beings to communicate with technology.11 AI can 
find patterns in brain data and decode brain activity to reveal aspects of human cognition. Even 
though there are not, yet, any algorithms that can reliably decode complex thoughts, it is 
possible to reveal mood and even single-digit numbers, shapes or simple words that are thought, 
heard or seen.12 It has been argued that “[t]his possibility of mining the mind (or at least 
informationally rich structural aspects of the mind) can be potentially used not only to infer 
mental preferences, but also to prime, imprint or trigger those preferences”.13 
 
6 Kallioinen, Noa, Pershina, Maria, Zeiser, Jannik, Nosrat Nezami, Farbod, Stephan, Achim, Pipa, Gordon & 
König, Peter. “Moral Judgements on the Actions of Self-driving Cars and Human Drivers in Dilemma Situations 
from Different Perspectives.” OSF Preprints, (2019). 
7 Martinez, Rogelio. “The Power of Artificial Intelligence.” Franchising World, vol. 50, no. 5, 2018, pp. 92–94. 
8 Lu, Huimin, Yujie Li, Min Chen, Hyoungseop Kim, and Seiichi Serikawa, “Brain Intelligence: Go Beyond 
Artificial Intelligence.”. 
9 Gottron, Thomas & Felix Schwagereit. “The Impact of the Filter Bubble -- A Simulation Based Framework for 
Measuring Personalisation Macro Effects in Online Communities.” ArXiv.org, 2016, pp. arXiv.org. 
10 Billinghurst, Mark. "Augmented Reality." The SAGE Encyclopedia of the Internet. Ed. Barney Warf. 
Thousand Oaks,: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2018. 35-40. SAGE Knowledge. Web. (Last accessed: 1/12 2019). 
11 Ienca, Marcello, “The Right to Cognitive Liberty.” Scientific American, vol. 317, no. 2, 2017, pp. 10 & Ienca, 
Marcello & Roberto Andorno, “Towards New Human Rights in the Age of Neuroscience and Neurotechnology.” 
Life Sciences, Society and Policy, vol. 13, no. 1, 2017, pp. 1–27, p. 4. 
12Anumanchipalli, Gopala K, Chartier, Josh & Chang, Edward F., “Speech Synthesis from Neural Decoding of 
Spoken Sentences.” Nature, vol. 568, no. 7753, 2019, pp. 493–498. & Whyte, Chelsea, “Mind-reading device 
uses AI to turn brainwaves into audible speech”, 24/4-2019, https://www.newscientist.com/article/2200683-
mind-reading-device-uses-ai-to-turn-brainwaves-into-audible-speech/ (Last accessed: 24/11-2019) & The 
Guardian, “Neuroscientists decode brain speech signals into written text”, 30/7-2019, 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019/jul/30/neuroscientists-decode-brain-speech-signals-into-actual-
sentences (Last accessed: 24/11-2019) & Greshko, Michael & Wei-Haas, Maya, “New device translates brain 
activity into speech. Here’s how”, National Geographic, Published: April 24, 2019 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2019/04/new-computer-brain-interface-translates-activity-into-
speech/ (Last accessed: 7/11-2019). 
13 Ienca, Marcello & Roberto Andorno, “Towards New Human Rights in the Age of Neuroscience and 
Neurotechnology.”, p. 4. 
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Human beings are now living in a world where the human being is increasingly entangled with 
AI. AI might actually affect human cognition and human cognition is now, possibly being 
produced in convergence with AI. Human beings do of course affect the cognition of other 
human beings, all the time. Social life may even be described as an infinite web of mutual 
influence.14 This condition poses the question; what are the legitimate ways of affecting 
someone’s cognition? 
Human beings are ascribed human rights and the international human rights framework sets out 
fundamental human rights to be universally protected. These rights are said to be inherent to 
every human being and are protecting different parts of human life.15 A foundation for human 
rights can be described as common human vulnerability,16 and human rights can be seen as 
protecting common human interests that are vulnerable and necessary for humans to be 
agents.17  
In the contemporary context, when the new phenomenon AI is affecting numerous parts of 
human life, it is possibly also affecting the protection given by the international human rights 
framework. There are, already recognized, human rights connecting to human cognition. For 
example, human thought is protected by the international human rights framework.18 However, 
there are those that argue that these recognized rights aren’t adequately protecting human 
cognition in this contemporary context.19 These ideas can be seen as supported by documented 
statements made by one of the drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
 
14 Bublitz, Jan & Christoph Merkel. “Crimes Against Minds: On Mental Manipulations, Harms and a Human 
Right to Mental Self-Determination.” Criminal Law and Philosophy, vol. 8, no. 1, 2014, pp. 51–77. 
15 United Nations, “Human rights”, 
https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/human-rights/ (Last accessed: 17/11-2019) 
16 Turner, Bryan S., “Sociology of Human Rights”, in Shelton, Dinah, (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of 
International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013) [Electronic] Available: Oxford 
university press, 
https://opil-ouplaw-com.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/view/10.1093/law/9780199640133.001.0001/law-9780199640133 
(Last accessed: 1/12-2019), p. 9 & This understanding will be discussed and elaborated on in the text. See. e.g. 
section 3.1.2. 
17 This understanding will be discussed and elaborated on in the text. See e.g. section 3.1.2. 
18 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp No 13, UN Doc 
A/810 (1948) 71, article 18 & International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI), 
Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, (1966), article 18. 
19 See Wrye, Sententia, “Neuroethical Considerations: Cognitive Liberty and Converging Technologies for 
Improving Human Cognition.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, vol. 1013, no. 1, 2004, pp. 221–
228, & Bublitz, Jan & Christoph Merkel. “Crimes Against Minds: On Mental Manipulations, Harms and a 
Human Right to Mental Self-Determination.” & The Center for Cognitive Liberty, 
http://www.cognitiveliberty.org (Last accessed: 17/11-2019) & Ienca, Marcello, “The Right to Cognitive 
Liberty.” & Farahany, Nita, ”Cognitive Liberty in the Era of Brain Hacking, The Aspen Institute”,  The Aspen 
Institute, Published: 11/9-2014, https://youtu.be/8CqgZ0V5pvY (Last accessed: 5/10 2019) & Ienca, Marcello & 
Roberto Andorno, “Towards New Human Rights in the Age of Neuroscience and Neurotechnology.”. 
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when speaking of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, that today is 
acknowledged in article 18 in the UDHR.20 
[I]t would be unnecessary to proclaim that freedom if it were never to be given an outward 
expression; if it were intended, so to speak, only for the use of the inner man. It was necessary 
however to stress the external manifestation of creeds by which expression was given to beliefs.21 
At the time of the drafting of the UDHR, it might not have been seen as necessary to protect 
human cognition that was not to be given an outward expression, but is that still the case today? 
Is the human cognition sufficiently protected from impact, influence, modulation, and 
manipulation in a time where human cognition is possibly being produced in convergence with 
AI? 
Voices have been raised to promote the idea that there is something in human vulnerability that 
is not protected, that the human rights protection needs to be expanded. A new concept that has 
been put forward in the judicial discourse is the concept, cognitive liberty. Cognitive liberty has 
been proposed as a conceptual update of existing human rights or as a new human right, which 
could serve as protection of human cognition in the contemporary context of AI influencing 
human life.22 
The new phenomenon AI has great implications, and to understand these, it is necessary to 
understand the landscape of the contemporary context of AI influencing human life. This text 
is an attempt to contribute to this understanding. My interest is focused on whether there is a 
need to rethink the protection of human cognition that the present international human rights 
framework offers and if this framework is elastic enough to be able to provide sufficient 
protection in the contemporary context of AI influencing human life. The purpose of this essay 
is, therefore, to explore if the introduction of AI into human society presents a need to rethink 
the protection of human cognition that the international human rights framework provides, as 
of today, and if the framework is elastic enough to be able to provide sufficient protection of 
 
20 GA, Third Committee, Third Session, 127th Meeting (1948), A/C.3/SR.127, at 395. & GA, Third Committee, 
Third Session, Draft International Declaration of Human Rights: Recapitulation of Amendments to Article 16 of 
the Draft Declaration (E/800), (1948), A/C.3/289/REV.1. 
21 GA, Third Committee, Third Session, meeting 127, at 395. 
22 Wrye, Sententia, “Neuroethical Considerations: Cognitive Liberty and Converging Technologies for 
Improving Human Cognition.” & Bublitz, Jan & Christoph Merkel. “Crimes Against Minds: On Mental 
Manipulations, Harms and a Human Right to Mental Self-Determination.” & The Center for Cognitive Liberty 
& Ienca, Marcello, “The Right to Cognitive Liberty.” & Farahany, Nita, ”Cognitive Liberty in the Era of Brain 
Hacking, The Aspen Institute” & Ienca, Marcello & Roberto Andorno, “Towards New Human Rights in the Age 
of Neuroscience and Neurotechnology.”. 
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human cognition in the contemporary context of AI influencing human life, given the 
understanding that human rights should be protecting common human interests that are 
vulnerable and that are necessary for humans to be agents.23  
1.2 Theory and method 
When a new phenomenon is introduced to any given context, there is a need to understand the 
new phenomenon. In order to understand new phenomena, it is sometimes necessary to employ 
new conceptualizations, or, as it is expressed in the Posthuman Glossary by Rosi Braidotti and 
Maria Hlavajova, “[w]e need new terms. And new terminologies require conceptual creativity, 
which means to trust in the powers of the imagination, as well as rely on academic credentials 
and conventions.”24 The new phenomenon, AI, has been introduced to the contemporary 
context and needs to be understood. Hence, new understandings are necessary. In an attempt to 
make questions and ideas that can contribute to this particular understanding of contemporary 
development visible I will, therefore, engage in a theoretical examination of the problem of 
protection of human cognition in a time where AI is affecting human life. This thesis is, thus, a 
theoretical examination of the conceptual stakes of a given new practical legal context.  
I suggest that posthuman theory can provide new terminologies and new understandings that 
we need in order to understand the contemporary context of AI and human cognition. I am thus, 
examining the problem from a posthuman theoretical perspective. In Braidottis words, the 
defining features of posthuman theory are, 
that it rests on a neo-materialist philosophy of immanence, which assumes that all matter is one 
(monism); that matter is intelligent and self-organizing (autopoiesis); that the subject is not unitary 
but nomadic; and that subjectivity includes relations to a multitude of non-human ‘others’. 25 
A posthuman understanding of the problem could, possibly, result in some kind of 
destabilization of human rights. I suggest that a posthuman understanding is helpful in 
understanding the landscape of the contemporary context of AI influencing human life. I do, 
 
23 This understanding will be discussed and elaborated on in the text. See e.g. section 3.1.2. 
24 Braidotti, Rosi & Hlavajova, Maria, “Introduction”, in Braidotti, Rosi, & Hlavajova, Maria, (ed.) Posthuman 
Glossary (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2018) [Electronic] Available: ProQuest Ebook Central, 
https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/lib/gu/reader.action?docID=5226228 (Last accessed: 1/12-
2019), p. 10. 
25 Braidotti, Rosi, “Posthuman critical theory”, in Braidotti, Rosi, & Hlavajova, Maria, (ed.) Posthuman Glossary 
(London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2018) [Electronic] Available: ProQuest Ebook Central, 
https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/lib/gu/reader.action?docID=5226228 (Last accessed: 1/12-
2019), p. 340. 
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however, also suggest that the concept of human rights can have a desirable function in human 
society. I am therefore not proposing posthuman rights. My suggestion is rather, that human 
rights, can be rethought in the light of a posthuman understanding of how AI affect human 
cognition. This will be discussed, further, in section 4.1. 
To understand the development of relevant aspects of AI that are affecting human cognition in 
ways that could show a need for protection of human cognition by the international human 
rights framework, I have been engaging in studies of texts, statements and terminology, present 
in the discourse connected to the development of AI. I have also studied material from 
contemporary discourses on cognition in order to understand how human cognition is described. 
To understand if/how the introduction of relevant aspects of AI is altering human vulnerability, 
I have further analysed how AI is affecting human cognition in light of a posthuman 
understanding of the world. 
To understand what the international human rights framework is protecting in so far as human 
cognition is concerned, I have moreover studied legal sources in the international human rights 
framework. 
To understand if the international human rights framework can provide protection of human 
cognition in the contemporary context of AI influencing human life it has been necessary to 
analyse if it is elastic enough to provide protection by rethinking of already recognized rights 
as well as by recognition of a new human right. To understand how elastic the international 
human rights framework is, in terms of rethinking already recognized rights to accommodate 
protection of human cognition, I have studied legal sources in the international human rights 
framework. To be able to analyse the necessity and possibility of recognition of cognitive 
liberty as a new right, I have studied legal sources and texts, statements and terminology in the 
legal discourse. This has been done to understand how the suggested new right has been 
described, and if it can be justified as a human right.  
To contribute to an understanding of the landscape of AI, human cognition and international 
human rights, findings from the review of texts, statements, terminology, and legal sources are 
described in this thesis. A posthuman understanding of the world is then used to analyse how 
AI affects human cognition in the contemporary context of AI influencing human life. To 
contribute to an understanding of whether the international human rights framework is elastic 
enough to accommodate protection of human cognition, in the contemporary context of AI 
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influencing human life, I am then analysing foundations and justifications for human rights and 
rules for the interpretation of international human rights together with conclusions from the 
other parts of the thesis. 
1.3 Material 
The material used in this thesis are texts, statements and terminology, collected from the areas 
of the discourse connected to the development of AI, the contemporary discourses on cognition, 
the international legal discourse, and legal sources, such as treaties, case law, preparatory works 
and doctrine. The selection of material used in this thesis is mainly done by searches on the 
Gothenburg university library webpage and Google scholar. This means that AI is present in 
the selection of material for this thesis of AI and human cognition. Personalization algorithms, 
that is studied in this thesis, is therefore also affecting this thesis.26 This will be further discussed 
in section 5. 
To be able to achieve awareness of the personalization algorithms in my study, I have taken a 
few measures. I have, to some extent, used Google's option to turn off personalized searches, 
to minimize personalization in my search results. However, as will be discussed in section 2.2.1, 
it is unclear to what degree and in what ways such searches are being filtered anyway. 
Personalization can, therefore, be present regardless of this option being used. Further, since 
this makes the sorting of information much harder it has not been possible to use this option for 
every search. However, to analyse my own search results, I have used the option as a way of 
controlling my results, after I have used personalized searches. Furthermore, I have used a 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) and stayed logged out from my Google account when searching 
for information. These measures make it harder to track my IP address and location and to 
connect my email with my search, which minimizes personalization in the search results.27 
These different measures make some aspects of, how my search results are personalized visible. 
 
26 C.f. Curkovic, Marko., “Need for Controlling of the Filter Bubble Effect.” Science and Engineering Ethics, 
vol. 25, no. 1, 2019, p. 323. 
27 See Giordano, Sarah, “Popping the Filter bubble”, 2014, https://derekbruff.org/blogs/fywscrypto/practical-
crypto/popping-the-filter-bubble/ (Last accessed: 18/11-2019) & See. A Dictionary of Computer Science 7 ed., 
“VPN”, Butterfield, Andrew, Ekembe Ngondi, Gerard & Kerr, Anne (ed.), (Oxford University press, 2016), 
https://www-oxfordreference-com.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/view/10.1093/acref/9780199688975.001.0001/acref-
9780199688975-e-6258?rskey=LboWvL&result=1 (Last accessed: 2/12 2019) & See Google, “Updating Our 
Privacy Policies and Terms of Service,” Google Official Blog, 24/1-2012, 
https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/updating-our-privacy-policies-and-terms.html (Last accessed: 11/12-
2019). 
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Since the development of AI is moving at a high pace, the selection of relevant material is, to a 
large degree, based on how recently the material was published. 
The selection of legal sources is based on the sources of international law, recognized in article 
38(1) the Statute of the International Court of Justice. International human rights law is a 
specialist regime within general public international law, the sources of international law are 
therefore also the recognized sources of human rights law.28  
Article 38 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply:  
• international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by 
the contesting states;  
• international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
• the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
• subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law.29 
The recognized sources of international human rights law can be summarised as treaties, 
international customary law, general principles of law, case law and scholarly writings. I am 
using these different sources to understand how the recognized rights, connecting to human 
cognition, have been described and what they are considered to protect, but also to understand 
how elastic the international human rights framework is, in this regard.  
To understand how the international human rights framework is protecting human cognition, I 
am in this thesis, studying the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
The ICCPR and the ICESCR are treaties and are therefore recognized sources of international 
human rights law. The UDHR is not a treaty. It is, however, generally agreed to be the 
foundation of international human rights law and to reflect customary law.30 This document, 
and the interpretations of it are therefore relevant for this thesis. I am studying these documents 
since they can be seen as the foundation of the international human rights framework. Other 
 
28 Besson, Samantha, “Justifications”, in Moeckli, Daniel, Sangeeta Shah, Sandesh Sivakumaran, & David J. 
Harris, (ed.) International Human Rights Law. Third ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018), p. 63-65. 
29 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946. 
30 United Nations, “The Foundation of International Human Rights Law”, 
https://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/foundation-international-human-rights-law/index.html 
(Last accessed: 7/11-2019). 
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topic-specific and/or regional documents have not been studied since the focus of this thesis is 
how the human cognition is protected on a general and universal level. I have found relevant 
human rights in the UDHR and the ICCPR.  
Further, customary law, general principles, case law and, scholarly writings are used to find 
rules of interpretation for the declaration and the treaty. To look at the intention of the parties 
is, in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, considered a rule of 
interpretation.31 I am, therefore, using documents from the drafting of the declaration and the 
treaty to determine the general interpretation of the relevant recognized provisions. To clarify 
the meaning of the provisions, I am also using general comments adopted by the Human Rights 
Committee, the body of independent experts that monitors implementation of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by its State parties. The general comments are adopted 
in accordance with ICCPR.32 
1.4 Delimitations 
There are many different kinds of AI that may affect human cognition. Since the purpose of 
this thesis is to explore if the introduction of AI into human society, presents a need to rethink 
the protection of human cognition, provided by the international human rights framework, I am 
studying some relevant examples of relevant kinds of AI. The kinds of AI that are studied are 
personalization algorithms; augmented reality technologies; and, some forms of 
neurotechnology.  
Further, there are many recognized human rights that can be seen as protecting parts of human 
cognition in different ways. Since this thesis is a study of the need to rethink the protection of 
human cognition, I am here discussing the relevant recognized rights in closest connection to 
human cognition, that could possibly offer protection of the human cognition, in the 
contemporary context of AI influencing human life. This will be further discussed in section 
3.2. 
 
31 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331, (1969), Article 
31(4) & Fitzmaurice, Malgosia, “Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties”, in Shelton, Dinah, (ed.) The Oxford 
Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013) [Electronic] Available: 
Oxford university press, 
https://opil-ouplaw-com.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/view/10.1093/law/9780199640133.001.0001/law-9780199640133 
(Last accessed: 1/12-2019), p. 7. 
32 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 40, paragraph 4. 
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1.5 Outline 
This thesis is divided into three main parts. First, AI and human cognition are discussed in 
section 2, second, international human rights are discussed in section 3 and third, Cognitive 
liberty is discussed in section 4. In the first part, I am describing relevant aspects of AI and 
human cognition. To understand if/how the introduction of AI can be seen as altering human 
vulnerability I am, further, in light of a posthuman understanding of the world, analysing how 
human cognition is affected in the encounter with AI. In the second part, I am describing 
relevant parts of the international human rights framework. To show that the history of human 
rights is an ongoing one, I am briefly describing the history of human rights. To present an 
understanding of the concept of human rights, I am describing foundations and justifications 
for human rights and to set a starting point for the following interpretation of substantive human 
rights I am describing rules of interpretation. In the third part, I am analysing the concept of 
cognitive liberty in the contemporary context of AI influencing human life. I am analysing 
rethinking of human rights in the contemporary context of AI influencing human life in relation 
to posthuman rights, the relevance of international human rights in the contemporary context 
of AI influencing human life and the need to rethink the protection of human cognition, given 
by the international human rights framework in the contemporary context of AI influencing 
human life. To understand if the international human rights framework is elastic enough to 
accommodate protection of human cognition in the contemporary context of AI influencing 
human life, I am then analysing already recognized rights in light of the contemporary context 
of AI influencing human life and cognitive liberty. That analysis is followed by an analysis of 
cognitive liberty as a new human right. The thesis is concluded with a further and summarizing 





2. Human Cognition and Artificial Intelligence 
2.1 Human cognition  
Human cognition, which is a central concept to this thesis, can be defined in numerous different 
ways. It can, for example, be defined generally, as “an umbrella term for all higher mental 
processes”.33 It can also be defined in more detail, for example, as “the collection of mental 
processes and activities used in perceiving, remembering, thinking, and understanding, as well 
as the act of using those processes”.34 These processes are thought to have evolved as a way of 
controlling action.35 The survival value in being able to perceive things is only thought to be 
present if the human being can respond to what is perceived.36 There is, thus, a need to process 
information37 which is perceived. Cognition has in line with this also been defined as “[t]he 
mental activities involved in acquiring and processing information”.38 From these ideas about 
cognition, the following definition can be derived: cognition is mental processes and activities, 
processing information and constituting perceiving, remembering, thinking, and understanding, 
as well as the act of using those processes. The medium for human information processing is 
thought to be the nervous system which consists of the brain, the peripheral nervous system, 
and the spinal cord. Information and motor commands are transmitted to and from the brain 
and the brain performs millions of computations upon the information it receives.39 The brain 
and activity in the brain is thus crucial to the mental processes, processing information.40 
 
33 Ashcraft, Mark H, Cognition. 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J: Prentice Hall, 2002), p. 10. 
34 Ashcraft, Mark H, Cognition, p. 11. 
35 See Glass, Arnold Lewis, Cognition (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 2. 
36 Glass, Arnold Lewis, Cognition, p. 2. 
37 Information can be defined in numerous different ways. I am using a definition that can be derived from 
Gilbert Simondons theory of individuation. Information is, defined in this way, modalities of change rather than 
mere attributes of entities. In-formation processes are processes in which matter gain form. (See Rodriguez, 
Pablo & Blanco, Javier, “Organization and Information in Simondon's Theory of Individuation.” Culture and 
Organization, vol. 23, no. 1, 2017, pp. 34–43.) Information gives the universe its structure and complexity. (See  
Cesar Hidalgo: "Why Information Grows" | Talks at Google, 6/8-2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r38kK26SieE (Last accessed: 26/11-2019), at 0.27 min) Physical origins of 
order are therefore relevant for the definition of information. The second law of thermodynamics says that the 
universe has a tendency to average itself out or to strive towards equilibrium. (See  
Cesar Hidalgo: "Why Information Grows" | Talks at Google, at 2.00 min.)  Systems that are out of equilibrium 
minimize the rate of entropy production. They are producing entropy, but they are producing as little entropy as 
possible. These systems are self-organizing to produce as little entropy as possible. It is in these systems that 
order emerges. (See  
Cesar Hidalgo: "Why Information Grows", at 4.50 min.). 
38 A Dictionary of psychology 4 ed., “Cognition”, Colman, Andrew M. (ed.), (Oxford University press 2015), 
https://www-oxfordreference-com.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/view/10.1093/acref/9780199657681.001.0001/acref-
9780199657681-e-1594?rskey=iftF5J&result=6 (Last accessed: 2/12 2019). 
39 Glass, Arnold, Cognition. (Mason, OH: Thomson Custom Pub, 2007), p. 8. 
40 See Glass, Arnold, Cognition, p.8, See Ashcraft, Mark H, Cognition, p.53-67 & See Glass, Arnold Lewis, 
Cognition, p. 53 & 132. 
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2.2 Artificial intelligence 
Considering the fact that there are numerous different definitions of AI,41 I am in this study, 
using a broad definition of the term, relying on the idea that AI is some kind of system that has 
some kind of ability that has been associated with intelligent beings.42 
Further, AI is commonly separated into two categories, general and narrow AI. Narrow AI is 
defined as systems that demonstrate intelligence in a specialized area. Whereas general AI has 
been defined as systems that “can solve a variety of complex problems in a variety of different 
domains, and that controls itself autonomously, with its own thoughts, worries, feelings, 
strengths, weaknesses and predispositions”.43 The vast part of the AI field today, is focusing on 
narrow AI. 44 The focus of this thesis is, therefore, narrow AI. 
AI encompasses a large variety of subfields.45 Different kinds of AI raise different challenges,46 
and human cognition is affected in different ways in encounters with different kinds of AI. To 
be able to start understanding the landscape of AI and human cognition in the contemporary 
context of AI influencing human life, I will, in the following sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, 
briefly discuss some relevant kinds of AI, namely AI in personalization algorithms, AI in 
augmented reality technology and AI in neurotechnology.  
2.2.1 Artificial intelligence in personalization algorithms 
The Internet is getting richer in information. It would, today, be impossible for a human being 
to sort the amount of information that is present on the internet.47 In an attempt to make this 
amount of information manageable for human beings, internet actors, such as the company 
 
41 Dobrev, Dimiter, “A Definition of Artificial Intelligence.” ArXiv.org, 2012, pp. arXiv.org. p. 2. 
42 See Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Artificial intelligence”, Copeland, B.J., Britannica Online Academic Edition, 
2019, https://www.britannica.com/technology/artificial-intelligence (Last accessed: 18-10-2019)& The EC High-
Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, AI HLEG, 2019, “Ethics Guidance for Trustworthy AI”, p. 36 & 
C.f. Russell, Stuart J, Norvig, Peter & Davis, Ernest, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, Global 
Edition, p. 4-5. 
43 Pennachin, Cassio & Goertzel, Ben, “Contemporary Approaches to Artificial General Intelligence”, In 
Goertzel Ben., Pennachin Cassio., (ed.) Artificial General Intelligence. Cognitive Technologies, (Springer-
Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007) [Electronic] Available: Springer Link, 
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-68677-4_1 (Last accessed: 1/12-2019). 
44 Pennachin, Cassio & Goertzel, Ben, “Contemporary Approaches to Artificial General Intelligence”.. 
45 Russell, Stuart J, Norvig, Peter & Davis, Ernest, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, Global Edition, 
p. 1. 
46 The EC High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, AI HLEG, 2019, “Ethics Guidance for 
Trustworthy AI”, p. 5. 
47 Krafft, Tobias, Michael Gamer, and Katharina Zweig, “What Did You See? Personalization, Regionalization 
and the Question of the Filter Bubble in Google's Search Engine.” ArXiv.org, 2018, arXiv.org. 
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Google, uses algorithms to filter the information in a personalized way.48 Personalization is 
enabled by algorithm-based systems, in which algorithms decide what content the human user 
might be interested in. This decision is determining what information is presented to the human 
being.49 
In the book, The filter bubble: what is the internet hiding from you, Eli Pariser, who is an 
internet activist and entrepreneur, coined the term filter bubble.50 It was coined to describe a 
situation in which online users, due to personalization algorithms, live in personalized 
information universes biased towards their own interests.51 The concept has been defined as a 
“phenomenon whereby the ideological perspectives of internet users are reinforced as a result 
of the selective algorithmic tailoring of search engine results to individual users (as reflected in 
recorded data such as search history, click data, and location)”.52 The term filter bubble has also 
been described as representing the unique, personal universe of online information, in which a 
human being lives. The boundaries of that universe depend on personalization algorithms in 
search engines and social networks. To decide which information is likely to be considered 
relevant, the algorithm considers the human user’s interaction with previously encountered 
information. The algorithm will show the information, that is labelled as likely to be considered 
relevant at higher ranks, and in some cases, it will even block out other information.53 Pariser 
suggests that “[f]or an individual user this might lead to a skewed and biased perception of the 
world”.54  
 
48 Google, “Updating Our Privacy Policies and Terms of Service,” & Google, “Så fungerar sökalgoritmer”, 
https://www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/algorithms/ (Last accessed: 31/10-2019). 
49 Krafft, Tobias, Michael Gamer, and Katharina Zweig, “What Did You See? Personalization, Regionalization 
and the Question of the Filter Bubble in Google's Search Engine.”. 
50 Pariser, Eli, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You (London: New York: Viking; Penguin 
Press, 2011). & Gottron, Thomas & Felix Schwagereit. “The Impact of the Filter Bubble -- A Simulation Based 
Framework for Measuring Personalisation Macro Effects in Online Communities.”. The book “The Filter 
Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You” does not derive from a scientific context. I do however think it is 
necessary to use the concept coined in the book since it has become a big part of the discourse, regarding this 
issue. I do further, want to assert that the concept, filter bubble, has gained scientific relevance which can be 
seen in the fact that it is being used in different scientific discussions. (See e.g. other references in this section). 
51 Gottron, Thomas & Felix Schwagereit. “The Impact of the Filter Bubble -- A Simulation Based Framework 
for Measuring Personalisation Macro Effects in Online Communities.”. 
52 A Dictionary of Social Media, “Filter Bubble.”, Chandler, Daniel, & Munday, Rod (ed.), (Oxford University 
press 2016), https://www-oxfordreference-
com.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/view/10.1093/acref/9780191803093.001.0001/acref-9780191803093-e-
482?rskey=m5WEu0&result=1 (Last accessed: 2/12 2019). 
53 Gottron, Thomas & Felix Schwagereit. “The Impact of the Filter Bubble -- A Simulation Based Framework 
for Measuring Personalisation Macro Effects in Online Communities.”  
54 Gottron, Thomas & Felix Schwagereit. “The Impact of the Filter Bubble -- A Simulation Based Framework 
for Measuring Personalisation Macro Effects in Online Communities.”. 
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In the book Are Filter Bubbles Real? Axel Bruns, professor in the Creative Industries Faculty 
at Queensland University of Technology in Brisbane, presents a more irresolute view on the 
concept of filter bubbles. He points out that empirical work on filter bubbles suffer from 
limitations such as the lack addressing the actual experience of the users. He further points out 
that users who are part of an apparent filter bubble on one platform could be consuming a 
broader spectrum of information on other platforms.55 Further, Kieron O'Hara, associate 
professor in Electronics and Computer Science and David Stevens, lecturer in the School of 
Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham, suggests that phenomena 
like filter bubbles can be beneficial under some circumstances, such as when enabling users to 
consume information that interests them and to follow news and other information at a level of 
complexity and detail that suits their level of information literacy.56 
Personalization is used not only by Google but also for example by Facebook, Youtube, Yahoo 
News and the New York Times-funded startup News.me.57 Pariser argues that “[t]ogether, these 
engines create a unique universe of information for each of us […] which fundamentally alters 
the way we encounter ideas and information”.58 Furthermore, Google has stated on its official 
blog that the “new Privacy Policy makes clear that, if you’re signed in, [Google] may combine 
information you've provided from one service with information from other services. In short, 
[Google will] treat you as a single user across all [Googles] products, which will mean a 
simpler, more intuitive Google experience”.59 Hence, personalization is a part of many aspects 
of the internet. 
Moreover, the reach of personalization algorithms has expanded beyond personal computers. 
An example of this is a billboard in Japan, that is using personalization algorithms and facial 
recognition on human beings passing by.60 Of relevance is also, Ambient Intelligence, which is 
a term for describing a “world in which ‘intelligence’ is embedded in virtually everything 
around us”.61 It has been described as a world where everything, “the clothes you wear, the 
 
55 Bruns, Axel, Are Filter Bubbles Real? Digital Futures Series, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), p. 11 & 15-35. 
56 O'Hara, Kieron & Stevens, David “Echo Chambers and Online Radicalism: Assessing the Internet's 
Complicity in Violent Extremism.” Policy & Internet, vol. 7, no. 4, 2015, pp. 401–422., p. 417 & Bruns, Axel, 
Are Filter Bubbles Real?, p. 12. 
57 Pariser, Eli, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You, p. 8. 
58 Pariser, Eli, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You, p. 9. 
59 Google, “Updating Our Privacy Policies and Terms of Service,”. 
60 The Guardian, “Advertising billboards use facial recognition to target shoppers” on& Gray, Richard, 
“Minority Report-style advertising billboards to target consumers” 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/7920057/Minority-Report-style-advertising-billboards-to-target-
consumers.html (Last accessed: 23/10-2019). 
61 Wright, David, “The Dark Side of Ambient Intelligence.” Info, vol. 7, no. 6, 2005, pp. 33–51. 
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paint on your walls, the carpets on your floor, the paper money in your pocket have a computer 
communications capability.”62 It has been called a world of smart dust and been described as 
the internet of things. David Wright, specialized in policy and regulatory issues relating to 
ambient intelligence, has predicted that this could be part of our near future.63 
A team at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, led by Professor of Marketing John Hauser, 
has further developed techniques for what the team call website morphing. Morphing is when 
not only the content on a website but also the look and feel are personalized. In this case based 
on what the team has called cognitive style, which is inferred from clickstream data.64 This 
technique is thus, further, personalizing not only the content but also how the content is 
presented.  
2.2.2 Artificial intelligence in augmented reality technology 
Augmented reality has been defined as “technology that seamlessly overlays virtual content 
over the real world so that both can be experienced at the same time”.65 The earliest examples 
of applications of augmented reality were probably the so-called heads-up-displays that were 
used in military airplanes and tanks. This was a technology that showed instrument panel-type 
information projected onto the same display as the one through which the pilot saw the 
surroundings.66 
Today, augmented reality technology can be found in products available for everyday use, such 
as noise cancelling headphones with functions that amplify sounds from the surroundings or 
Google Glass. Google Glass is a wearable device that, according to Google itself, provides 
“glanceable, voice-activated assistance that is designed to be worn all day”.67 Mercedes-Benz 
is also using augmented reality, for navigation, in Mercedes driver assist. The technique is 
showing navigation and traffic information in live pictures. A camera is filming the 
 
62 Wright, David, “The Dark Side of Ambient Intelligence.”. 
63 Wright, David, “The Dark Side of Ambient Intelligence.”. 
64 Braun, Michael, Hauser, John & Urban, Glen & Liberali, G. “Website Morphing.” Marketing Science: the 
Marketing Journal of TIMS/ORSA, vol. 28, no. 2, 2009, pp. 202–223. 
65 Billinghurst, Mark. "Augmented Reality.". 
66 Encyclopædia Britannica, “Augmented Reality”, Hosch, William L., Britannica Online Academic Edition, 
2019, https://www.britannica.com/technology/augmented-reality (Last accessed: 18-10-2019). 
67 Google, “Glass”, https://www.google.com/glass/tech-specs/ (Last accessed: 23/10-2019). 
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surroundings and highlighting certain details, such as house numbers, street names or traffic 
lights.68 
2.2.3 Artificial intelligence in non-invasive neurotechnology 
Easy and cheap neuro-devices are, today, available to human beings. Examples of neuro-
devices that are available, on the market, are the headsets Emotiv, Neurosky and Muse.69 Other 
examples of neurotechnology are Freer logic performance monitor, which is a device that, to 
understand the performance of a human being in the situation at hand, is monitoring brain 
activity to determine the state of mind of the human being. This device is being used by for 
example National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).70 A head-based wearable 
technology called Mindrider, originally developed at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
analyses how movements, and location engage a human brain.71 These kinds of 
neurotechnology are recording Electroencephalography (EEG) to observe electrical activity in 
the human brain.72 Another neurotechnology that is available today, is so-called brain 
fingerprinting. Brain fingerprinting uses the EEG recordings of a human brain and puts it in 
relation to the human being’s memory of events, as an improved polygraph. It computes a 
determination of if information is present or not and statistical confidence of the determination. 
Laboratory and field testing made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence 
Agency and the United States Navy has supposedly resulted in zero percent errors.73 
2.3 Human cognition in convergence with artificial intelligence 
AI is now a part of human life and human beings are part of the technological environment.74 
Human beings and human cognition are becoming connected to AI. Braidotti describes these 
 
68 Mercedes benz, “MBUX Augmented Reality för navigation”, 
https://www.mercedes-benz.se/passengercars/mercedes-benz-cars/models/eqc/comfort.pi.html/mercedes-benz-
cars/models/eqc/comfort/comfort-gallery/augmented-video (Last accessed: 23/10-2019). 
69 Emotiv, https://www.emotiv.com (Last accessed: 11/12-2019), Neurosky, http://neurosky.com, (Last accessed: 
11/12-2019) & Muse, https://choosemuse.com, (Last accessed: 11/12-2019). 
70 Farahany, Nita, ”Cognitive Liberty in the Era of Brain Hacking, The Aspen Institute” & Freerlogic, 
http://www.freerlogic.com/products/hardware (Last accessed: 23/10-2019). 
71 Mindriderdata, http://mindriderdata.com (Last accessed: 23/10-2019). 
72 Ienca, Marcello & Roberto Andorno, “Towards New Human Rights in the Age of Neuroscience and 
Neurotechnology.”, p. 4. 
73 Farwell, Lawrence, “Brain Fingerprinting: a Comprehensive Tutorial Review of Detection of Concealed 
Information with Event-Related Brain Potentials.” Cognitive Neurodynamics, vol. 6, no. 2, 2012, pp. 115–154, 
p. 115. 
74 C.f. Paasonen, Susanna, “Networked affect”, in Braidotti, Rosi, & Hlavajova, Maria, (ed.) Posthuman 
Glossary (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2018) [Electronic] Available: ProQuest Ebook Central, 
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altered boundaries, between what is human and what is technology, as the posthuman 
condition.75 A theoretical point of departure in posthuman theory is the need to “overcome 
binaries and to state that matter, the world and humans themselves are not dualistic entities 
structured according to dialectic principles of internal or external opposition, but rather 
materially embedded subjects-in-process circulating within webs of relation with forces, 
entities, and encounters”.76 In the book “How We Became Posthuman”, Katherine Hayles 
discuss how she has noticed two tendencies of how the human being has been subjected to 
alienation by AI. On the one hand, she argues that there is one type of narrative that indicates 
the fear of loss of humanity and loss of control, but also fear of dissolution of the human self. 
She argues that these narratives comprise a perception of technology as separate from the 
human body. On the other hand, she argues, that there are stories that suggest a contrasting 
perception of the human in relation to the contemporary context of AI influencing human life. 
She argues that by disentangling assumptions about the human as an independent entity, the 
possibility for the human to live in close connection with other life forms, renders available. 77 
In light of this idea, I suggest that understanding human cognition as entangled with AI, such a 
possibility can be made available. However, I further suggest that understanding human 
cognition in such a way can also alter the understanding of human vulnerability. 
2.3.1 Understanding human cognition as entangled with artificial intelligence 
AI in personalization algorithms and in augmented reality technology is filtering and shaping 
the flow of information that is reaching human cognition. These technologies use data about 
the human being to shape the flow of information. The human being and the human cognition 
is thus being increasingly entangled with AI. There are, as Braidotti and Hlavajova express it 
“new forms of interconnection between humans and non-human factors and agents”.78  
 
https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/lib/gu/reader.action?docID=5226228 (Last accessed: 1/12-
2019), p. 284. 
75 Braidotti, Rosi, The Posthuman (Oxford: Polity Press, 2013) [Electronic] Available: ProQuest Ebook Central, 
https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/lib/gu/detail.action?docID=1315633 (Last accessed: 1/12-
2019), passim. 
76 Braidotti, Rosi & Hlavajova, Maria, “Introduction”, p. 8. 
77 Hayles, N. Katherine, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics 
(Chicago, Ill.: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 235-240 & See also Pisters, Patricia, “Body without organs”, in 
Braidotti, Rosi, & Hlavajova, Maria, (ed.) Posthuman Glossary (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2018) 
[Electronic] Available: ProQuest Ebook Central, https://ebookcentral-proquest-
com.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/lib/gu/reader.action?docID=5226228 (Last accessed: 1/12-2019), p. 75-76. 
78 Braidotti, Rosi & Hlavajova, Maria, “Introduction”, p. 2. 
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In the book chapter “Where are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane 
Artefacts” Bruno Latour argues that even very commonplace technologies can shape the 
decisions humans make and the way humans are moving through the world.79 He reasons that 
“[t]hey persuade, facilitate and enable particular human cognitive processes, actions or 
attitudes, while constraining, discouraging and inhibiting others”.80 AI, in personalization 
algorithms and augmented reality technologies, prioritize and present information in a 
particular order and the selection of information a human being get to see is, therefore, affected. 
AI can thus be seen as shaping a human being's perception, experience, existence, and action.81 
Since human cognition, as defined in this thesis, is mental processes processing information it 
can be seen as persuading, facilitating and enabling particular human cognitive processes 
actions and attitudes. Since the selection of information, a human being doesn’t get to see is 
also affected, AI is also constraining, discouraging and inhibiting other cognitive processes. As 
Pariser argues, personalization algorithms and filter bubbles make it less likely that chance 
encounters will happen. Pariser states that a world constructed from the familiar, by definition, 
“is a world in which there’s nothing to learn. If personalization is too acute, it could prevent us 
from coming into contact with the mind-blowing, preconception-shattering experiences and 
ideas that change how we think about the world and our-selves”.82 In this way, Pariser claims 
that “the rise of the filter bubble doesn’t just affect how we process news. It can also affect how 
we think”.83 Pariser, further, argues that a narrow filter bubble impedes creativity.84 Studies 
show that human beings that have been assigned creative attributes tend to see things in many 
different ways and place them in wide categories.85 When filter bubbles show results that are 
narrow by selection, this might constrain possible ways in which things can be seen and, 
therefore, constrain creativity. Since creativity can be argued to consist of mental processes, 
human cognition can in this way be seen as affected in the encounter with AI in personalization 
algorithms. 
 
79 Latour, Bruno, “Where are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artefacts,” in W. Bijker & 
J. Law (eds.), Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Socio-Technical Change, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT press, 1992) pp. 225–258. [Electronic] Available: Nottingham Trent University, 
http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/50-MISSING-MASSES-GB.pdf, p.151, passim. 
80 Latour, Bruno, “Where are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artefacts,”, p.151, passim. 
81 See Noorman, Merel, "Computing and Moral Responsibility", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Spring 2018 Edition), Zalta, Edward N., (ed.), 2012 (edited 2018), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/computing-responsibility/ (Last accessed: 2/12-2019). 
82 Pariser, Eli, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You, p. 15. 
83 Pariser, Eli, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You, p. 76. 
84 Pariser, Eli, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You, p. 99. 
85 Cropley, Arthur J., Creativity in Education and Learning: A Guide for Teachers and Educators (London: 
Kogan Page, 2001) e.g p. 113. 
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Latour presents a model for understanding what a nonhuman does or in other words what role 
or function it has. He exemplifies with the nonhuman, the door and asks; what work would 
humans have to do if they had no door? He says that we have delegated the work of reversibly 
solving the wall-hole dilemma. Latour suggests that “[a]s a more general descriptive rule, every 
time you want to know what a nonhuman does [what its role or function is], simply imagine 
what other humans or other nonhumans would have to do were this character not present”.86 
This model can be applied to better understand what the relevant kinds of AI does in relation to 
human cognition. To understand what the nonhumans, the relevant kinds of AI, does we can 
imagine what other humans or other nonhumans would have to do if the relevant kinds of AI 
were not present. If AI in personalization algorithms were not present, other humans or 
nonhumans would have to sort through massive amounts of information to find and decide what 
information is relevant to the specific human being connecting to the AI, in the specific situation 
that the human being is in, and for the decision and cognitive process which that human being 
is about to undertake. It can, therefore, be derived that the AI sorts through these amounts of 
information, finds and decides what information that is relevant to the specific human being, in 
that specific situation and for the decision and cognitive process that the human being is about 
to undertake. If AI in augmented reality technology was not present, other humans or non-
humans would have to analyse the surrounding environment and, at the same time, sort through 
massive amounts of information to find and decide what information is relevant to the specific 
human being connecting to the AI, in the specific situation, and for the decision and cognitive 
process that the human being is about to undertake. It can, therefore, be derived that the AI in 
augmented reality technology is analysing the environment, sorts through information, finds 
and decides what information is relevant to the specific human being, in the specific situation 
that the human being is in and for the decision and cognitive process that the human being is 
about to undertake. What AI in augmented reality technology does is similar to what it does in 
personalization algorithms, with the addition that AI in augmented reality technology is 
analysing the surrounding environment. If AI in non-invasive neurotechnology were not 
present, other humans or non-humans would have to reveal some of the content of human 
cognition. Other methods of revealing the content of human cognition would require the human 
being itself to actively reveal the content, through for example telling what it is. It is, therefore, 
likely that it would, in some instances when the human connecting to the AI is not willing to 
reveal the content of its cognition, require coercion or force. It can, therefore, be derived that 
 
86 Latour, Bruno, “Where are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artefacts,”, p. 155. 
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the AI in non-invasive Neurotechnology does reveal the content of human cognition. It is 
further likely that it, in some instances, does this through coercion or force. With these 
understandings, of what these kinds of AI do, as a basis, I suggest that it is evident that human 
cognition is being affected in the encounter with the discussed kinds of AI. 
As is discussed in the Posthuman Glossary, the development of new techniques within the field 
of AI, such as artificial neural networks and machine learning, entails “the emergence of 
automated systems of knowledge”.87 In that manner, the development of AI has reduced 
knowledge to information, and information has itself become coinciding with large amounts of 
complex data that is processed, correlated and modelled by learning algorithms.88 The 
introduction of AI has, thus, affected the way in which information is processed. The 
information that is reaching human beings is, today, often processed by AI. Since human 
cognition, as it is defined in this thesis, consist of mental processes that is processing 
information, the altered way in which information is processed is affecting the human cognition. 
Moreover, Hayles argues that technology presents new capacities to process massive amounts 
of information. She further argues that it fundamentally extends knowledge production. 
Technology has in that manner an impact on modes of understanding and learning.89 
Understanding and learning can, in accordance with the definition of cognition used in this 
thesis, be defined as constituted by human cognition and it can, therefore, be argued that human 
cognition is affected in the encounter with AI, that is changing the way that information is 
processed.  
The impact of AI in personalization algorithms and so-called filter bubbles has been tested, 
even though, to my knowledge, not in any largescale researches.90 One test of the implications 
of filter bubbles has been based on three signals for human beings in a filter bubble. These 
being: “(1) a reduction of the active social context, (2) a reduction of the vocabulary a user 
perceives and (3) users perceives messages mainly or only from the fields of her core 
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interests”.91 In this study, it was found that filter bubble effects do occur when AI in 
personalized algorithms are being used. The human users were found to have a biased 
perception that was based on the interests of the user. However, the effect was, on average, not 
strong enough for the user not to be able to get out of the bubble.92 Moreover, in 2012, a team 
of psychologists from Cornell University conducted a Facebook emotional manipulation study 
which involved the feeds of 689,003 Facebook users. The study was controversial, especially 
since it was performed without the human users’ explicit informed consent. The AI in 
personalization algorithms selecting the content of the human users’ feeds were tweaked and 
manipulated to show more or less positive or negative posts. This was done to examine how 
such manipulation of the personalization algorithms affected the human users’ emotional states. 
It was found that emotional states can be affected by this kind of altering of personalization 
algorithms.93 
It is in this context interesting to point out that some services such as Google are providing an 
option to turn off personalized searches as an alternative.94 It is, however, not clear how the 
remaining filter algorithm is working. Other services are not providing that option. It can, 
however, still be argued that humans have the choice to use services that are not using 
personalized filtering. The invisible character of personalization, the investment in social 
networks and the lack of alternatives can, however, make such a decision difficult.95 Further, 
Facebook, which can currently be described as a dominant social networking site has stated that 
it aims to cater for what has been called happy accidents. The happy accident algorithm is set 
to render visible unexpected information.96 If applied, such a design could be decreasing the 
discussed way in which human cognition is affected in the encounter with AI in personalization 
algorithms. 
Moreover, as pointed out by Bruns, O’Hara and Stevens the effect of personalization algorithms 
and filter bubbles, as of today, can be questioned and can under some circumstances be 
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described as beneficial to human beings.97 However, the fact that personalization algorithms 
enable a possibility for human cognition to be affected in new ways can be seen as enough of a 
reason to consider protection of human cognition regardless of the extent to which the effects 
are present today.  
2.3.2 Understanding human cognition as entangled with artificial intelligence and an altered 
human vulnerability 
It can be argued that human beings have always been affected by nonhumans. As Hayles argues 
in her article “computing the human” “[a]nthropologists have long recognized that the 
construction of artifacts and living spaces materially affects human evolution”.98 Hayles further 
reasons that “[w]e need not refer to something as contemporary and exotic as genetic 
engineering to realize that for millennia, a two-cycle phenomenon has been at work: humans 
create objects, which in turn help to shape humans”.99 This does, according to Hayles not 
diminish the fact that AI is an object created by human beings that are now shaping human 
beings.  
Human cognition can be seen as always having been affected by non-humans, however, this 
does not diminish the fact that AI is affecting human cognition. Further, the introduction of AI 
can be argued to have changed the ways in which human cognition can be affected. For 
example, humans have, according to Pariser, always consumed media that is personally 
interesting, and ignored other media. However, Pariser argues that the new phenomenon, AI in 
personalization algorithms, introduces three new dynamics. The first one is that human beings 
are alone in a filter bubble, as opposed to that not being the case in previous ways of consuming 
information where there have always been some other humans to share a frame of reference 
with. The second new dynamic is that the filter bubble is invisible. When consuming 
information from news sources, such as newspapers or television, many humans know that they 
are getting the information from a source with a particular political view. The agenda behind 
AI in personalization algorithms, for example Google’s agenda, is opaquer since it isn’t visible 
how the AI is categorizing the human or why it is showing the specific results the human being 
gets to see. The human being, using services such as Google, haven’t chosen the criteria by 
which the information is filtered through, which can create the illusion that the information is 
unbiased. Pariser, therefore, argues that it is almost impossible to see how biased the sorting of 
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information actually is. The last new dynamic is that the human doesn’t choose to enter the 
bubble. He argues that it is an active choice to consume newspapers and television channels, 
while the filter bubble comes to the human.100 
Further, it has been argued that the case for most computer technologies is such that “[u]sers 
only see part of the many computations that a computer performs and are for the most part 
unaware of how it performs them; they usually only have a partial understanding of the 
assumptions, models, and theories on which the information on their computer screen is 
based”.101 Pariser has stated that polls show that a huge majority of human beings assume that 
search engines are unbiased. He argues that this may be a result of the condition that search 
engines in fact are being increasingly biased to share the human’s own views. Pariser, therefore, 
claims that personalized search marked a turning point of a nearly invisible revolution in how 
humans consume information.102 This invisibility of personalization algorithms marks a 
difference from other ways of receiving information, where the filtering of information is often 
more visible. Moreover, AI in personalization algorithms reaches beyond personal computers 
and content.103 This makes the ways in which AI can affect human cognition far-reaching. 
Another example of how AI has changed the ways in which human cognition can be affected 
is concerning neurotechnology. More rudimental and non-computational techniques, such as 
interrogation, polygraph-based lie detection, psychoactive drugs, and hypnotic inductions have 
been used, in ways that can be argued to affect human cognition, before cutting-edge 
neurotechnology was introduced to the human society. However, these techniques do not 
directly target neural processing but instead via speech, behaviour or physiological indices. 
Further, the degree of accuracy of the results of such techniques is very low. Based on such 
considerations it can be argued that neurotechnology is enabling a significantly higher degree 
of access into and manipulation of neural processes.104 
Based on these analyses, it can be argued that the contemporary context of AI influencing 
human life comprises AI that is affecting human cognition in ways that have not been possible 
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before. When AI is affecting human cognition, it is affecting how human beings think, perceive, 
remember and understand, it is changing the how in human cognition. Before the introduction 
of AI, human cognition could not be affected in these ways. After this introduction, human 
cognition can be affected in these ways and humans can, therefore, think in other ways. The 
how in human cognition, how humans think, perceive, remember, and understand, can therefore 
be different. Since human cognition is now exposed to these ways of being affected, I suggest 
that human vulnerability can be seen as altered.  
Human beings have been described as biologically vulnerable as embodied agents.105 Changes 
to embodiment must, thus, have implications for human vulnerability.106 The medium for 
human information processing, and human cognition, is thought to be the nervous system that 
consists of the brain the peripheral nervous system, and the spinal cord.107 When the human 
being and human cognition is being increasingly entangled with AI this can, therefore, have 
implications for human vulnerability. Human cognition is, as presented in section 2.1, thought 
to have evolved as a way of controlling action and, thus, as a way processing information, so 
that the human being can respond to what is perceived.108 The survival value in being able to 
perceive is only thought to be present if the perceived information can be processed.109 When 
AI in personalization algorithms and augmented reality technology is affecting human 
cognition, through deciding what information the human being is presented with, and therefore 
is perceiving, it is affecting the evolved way of controlling action. The perceived information 
can be seen as the basis for action and humans must, therefore, be seen as vulnerable to filtering 
of information that does not constitute a suitable basis for action. Since information can be seen 
as the basis for action, there is a vulnerability in the fact that information can be filtered in ways 
that are not suitable as a basis for action. Since the methods that AI is using for filtering 
information is largely unknown to a human being, it is difficult for the human to decide if the 
information is suitable for action or not.110 The evolved way of processing information is 
therefore vulnerable when AI in personalization algorithms and augmented reality technology 
is filtering information. Further, AI in neurotechnology is revealing parts of the content of 
human cognition. It is, therefore, revealing content of the evolved way of controlling action and 
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of processing information. As discussed in section 2.3.1, the revealing of parts of the content 
of human cognition can, further, be seen as done through some kind of coercion or force since 
some kinds of neurotechnology can reveal content of human cognition without the consent of 
the human being. This kind of AI makes it possible to, in real-time, observe and update the 
influence that is exercised on human cognition. The human being and human cognition can, 
therefore, be seen as vulnerable to the possibility of revealing the content of cognition without 
its consent. Based on this analysis human cognition can be seen as vulnerable to AI in 
personalization algorithms and augmented reality technology filtering information and to the 
possibility of revealing the content of human cognition without the human’s consent. Human 
vulnerability can be seen as altered by the condition that human cognition is now increasingly 















3. The Concept Human Rights  
3.1.1 A brief history of International human rights 
The idea of human rights has a long history. Going back in history, concepts related to human 
rights can be found in ancient civilizations, across the world. It is probably not possible to define 
a precise starting point for the history of human rights or to credit any specific culture, region 
or religion with its origins. The human rights system is complex, there are many different 
aspects to it, and it is impossible to identify one of these aspects as the beginning. Despite these 
difficulties, the Magna Carta is typically regarded as the starting point of the history of human 
rights.111  
It is, however, clear that human rights history started on the domestic level. Before the 1940s, 
there was no real conception of human rights on the international level. During the second world 
war, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill spoke about human freedoms, and human rights 
became one of the moral bases upon which the war was fought. When the war ended the United 
Nations (UN) charter was framed as a starting point for the endeavour to create legal 
instruments protecting human rights. The UN Commission on Human rights was instituted to 
create an international bill of rights, a human rights instrument applicable to all states and 
people across the globe. The work of the commission resulted among other things in the 
Universal Declaration of Human rights. 1954 the Commission also completed the drafts of what 
would become the ICCPR and the ICESCR.112 
Eleanor Roosevelt, who chaired the Commission, described the UDHR as a possible Magna 
Carta for mankind.113 The Magna Carta was a kind of a starting point for domestic protection 
of human rights. In the same manner, the UDHR can be seen as a starting point for international 
protection of human rights.   
It has been expressed that; 
the history of human rights law, both at the domestic and the international level, confirms that ‘[t]he 
vindication of human liberties does not begin with their complete and triumphant assertion at the 
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very outset’. Rather, ‘it commences with their recognition in some matters, to some extent, for some 
people, against some organ of the State’.114 
The history of human rights can in this manner be seen as ongoing.  
3.1.2 What should be protected by human rights? Foundations and justification for human 
rights 
The traditional view of human rights is that they are inherent to human beings and that they are 
to be attributed to humans simply by the fact of being human.115 Human rights can, in line with 
that view, be seen as protecting universal or common human interests. A challenge with this 
idea is to determine interests that every human shares.116 It poses the question of what it is that 
humans have in common that allows us to talk about a common world and common human 
interests.117 Is there something in the human ontology that can secure a foundation for common 
human interests and human rights? 118 Human beings have been described as biologically 
vulnerable as embodied agents and, therefore, in need of social institutions in order to protect 
themselves from the contingencies of the world. Human rights require a wide social consensus 
and it has been suggested that the needed social consensus could be grounded in recognition of 
common human vulnerability and the need for effective social institutions.119 Common human 
vulnerability can, therefore, be seen as a foundation for human rights. If human vulnerability is 
seen as something common in human ontology, human vulnerability entails the condition that 
there can be common human interests that are vulnerable. It has, further, been claimed that 
humans have rights only to interests necessary to be agents,120 and that human rights should 
respond to common and serious threats to important goods or interests.121 Based on these ideas, 
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common human interests that are vulnerable and necessary for humans to be agents can be seen 
as common human interests that should be protected by human rights.122 
Moral justifications that are commonly put forward as justifications for human rights are 
equality and dignity, also referred to in the preambles of the UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR.123 
Equality as a moral justification can also be referred to as equal moral status. Equal moral status 
is the idea that all people have equal worth. Equal moral status can also be seen as including 
the idea that there are claims that all humans are entitled to make on one another, simply based 
on their status as human beings. The two core ideas, in this understanding of equal moral status, 
are that all humans should be seen as having the same moral worth and that the equal moral 
worth is the basis for mutual moral claim. The concept of human rights is one phenomenon that 
constitutes a human’s equal moral status and human rights protect interests that can give rise to 
entitlements that are constitutive of equal moral status.124 Dignity, as a moral justification, can 
be used to refer to what is unique in human beings. This can be formulated as the possession of 
personhood and the capacity for rational and moral agency. Dignity can be seen as identical to 
the idea captured by the concept of equal moral status. It is thus unclear if dignity is an 
independent justification for human rights. Article 1 in the UDHR refers to human beings being 
born equal in dignity and rights. This implies that dignity is not a justification on its own, but 
rather a value that can be seen as a part of the justification equality.125  
3.1.3 Interpretation of human rights 
Interpretation of human rights is a complex undertaking. Rules for interpretation of 
international treaties are provided in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This 
treaty was concluded in 1969, which is after the drafting of the human rights treaty, discussed 
and interpreted in this thesis. Even though VCLT is non-retroactive, human rights law has 
generally acknowledged the application of VCLT, and its rules of interpretation, as customary 
law.126 
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Prior to the VCLT, there were, broadly, three schools of interpretation of human rights. The 
first of these laid great emphasis on the travaux préparatoires, the second was the textual 
approach and the third was the teleological approach, placing great emphasis on the object and 
purpose of the treaty. The three schools of thought were incorporated in the VCLT. 127 The 
provisions that provide the rules for interpretation in VCLT is Article 31 and 32; 
 
Article 31, GENERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, 
including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with 
the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the 
treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions; 
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the 
parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. 
 
Article 32. SUPPLEMENTARY MEANS OF INTERPRETATION  
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of 
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from 
the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 
31: 
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.128 
These articles are not considered to provide step-by-step formulas for interpretation in every 
case, but rather to indicate elements that should be taken into consideration.129 
Rules that are of certain interest in interpreting human rights can be found in Article 31(1), (2), 
(3) & (4). Article 31(1) provides that interpretation shall be made in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to a provision in the context and in light of its object and 
purpose.130 Since human rights are usually formulated with abstract concepts or general 
terminology, it may prove especially difficult to find an acceptable ordinary meaning in the 
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field of human rights.131 The contemporaneity is also problematic since the ordinary meaning 
of a term is developing with time. Moreover, the object and purpose can be hard to establish.132 
Article 31(1) is incorporating the principle of integration that can be seen as widening the scope 
of ordinary meaning. Article 31(2) is further, extending the concept “context” to include other 
related agreements. Article 31(3) extend the scope of interpretation even further to include 
important additional matter. Article 31(3)(c) more specifically permits any relevant rules of 
international law to be taken into account.133 
Moreover, article 31(4) provides that a “special meaning shall be given to a term if it is 
established that the parties so intended”.134 Given the growing importance of multilateral 
treaties, interpretation based on common intentions of the parties has become harder and harder. 
This shift, from bilateral to multilateral agreements have thus led to an interpretive 
methodology concentrated on, what have been called, more objective and ascertainable 
principles. The intention of the parties does, nevertheless, remain an important factor for 
interpretation.135 
The rules of interpretation in VCLT provide a starting point for interpreting human rights. 
Interpretation of human rights does, however, also require consideration of other practices, that 
have been introduced by human rights courts and human rights treaty bodies. Human rights 
bodies have frequently asserted that their interpretation is consistent with the rules in VCLT. 
However, positions that are hard to reconcile with the VCLT provisions have been adopted and 
these are generally viewed as, at least, expanding on traditional methods or even as introducing 
new methods. Further, the provisions in VCLT are not entirely clear and in addition to that, 
human rights are often general, vague and subjective in character.136 It is, therefore, generally 
acknowledged that an expansive attitude towards the interpretation of human rights is 
needed.137  
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Human rights share certain specific characteristics, that may influence the interpretation. One 
shared characteristic is the subject matter which gives rise to an approach to interpretation 
sometimes referred to as the pro homine approach, or the notion that international human rights 
should be centred around the human being.138 A second shared characteristic is the so-called 
constitutional and the non-reciprocal nature of human rights. This may lead to a reduction of 
the importance of the actual text of a treaty, in relation to other factors, in particular, the object 
and purpose of a treaty.139 Further, by giving considerable weight to preambles of conventions 
and even to human rights declarations, to which the preambles often refer, a strong teleological 
approach to interpretation has been adopted by human rights fora.140  
An interpretative tool based on the notion of object and purpose is evolutive interpretation.141 
UN human rights bodies have, relied upon the concept of dynamic interpretation of treaties, 
interpreting treaties according to contemporary standards. The Human Rights Committee has 
for example, expressly stated that the ICCPR should be interpreted as a living instrument and 
that the provisions of that treaty should be interpreted in the context and in light of present-day 
conditions.142  
Another tool of interpretation that has been used in human rights courts and tribunals is the 
object and purpose test, which relates to the doctrine of effectiveness. This doctrine is captured 
by the maxim that a treaty is presumed to have a definite force and effect. In order to ensure 
that all provisions of a treaty have an independent and non-superfluous meaning, a treaty may 
be interpreted expansively.143  
Moreover, to interpret and clarify the meaning of provisions, the Human Rights Committee 
does in accordance with ICCPR adopt general comments on articles in the covenant.144 
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3.2 Recognized substantive human rights in connection to human cognition 
With the complexity of human cognition in mind, it is possible to find connections to many of 
the recognized international human rights. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is 
perhaps the one most commonly referred to when discussing the protection of human cognition. 
Another right that is closely connected to human cognition is freedom of opinion and 
expression. In the contemporary context of AI influencing human life other rights, such as the 
right to privacy, the right to property, the right to a fair trial and the principle against self-
incrimination, can be relevant for the protection of human cognition. This thesis is, however, 
focusing on the rights in closest connection to human cognition. The following sections 3.2.1 
and 3.2.2 are thus focusing on how these two rights have been described and interpreted. The 
other mentioned rights can possibly only protect parts of human cognition, such as privacy of 
human cognition, data about human cognition as property and parts of human cognition that 
can be self-incriminating. The study of these rights is therefore not necessary to understand if 
human cognition is sufficiently protected in the international human rights framework.  
3.2.1 Freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
Article 18  
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom 
to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public 
or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. 
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights145 
Article 18  
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include 
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion 
or belief of his choice.  
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
 
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights146 
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The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is recognized in the UDHR and in the 
ICCPR. It has been discussed as an essential human right, and some of the drafters of the UDHR 
even called it the most important right in the declaration and the basis and origin of all other 
rights.147  
The right to freedom of thought can be seen as connected to human cognition, since human 
cognition is mental processes that, as it is defined in this thesis, is constituting thought.148 The 
wording of the article in which the right is recognized does, thus, entail a connection between 
the right and human cognition.  
However, the wording of the right is unclear as to what is included in the protection and in what 
way human cognition can be protected. Complaints to supervisory international organs have 
relatively seldom regarded the right in question.149 Since the right has been seen as having an 
unproblematic character, there are, moreover, few clarifications to the meaning of the right. It 
has been said in the literature that the: 
difficulties start when we come to the right to express one's conviction, the right to organize as a 
community in order to promote a religion or belief and the right to act in accordance with one's 
conscience even in cases where a domestic legal system seems to require uniform behaviour 
irrespective of the different convictions held by individuals. The real problems concerning freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion do not concern the nucleus of the right itself, the freedom of the 
forum internum or an inner state of mind, but issues that relate also to other human rights. The 
interdependence of the right under discussion with other human rights, including freedom of 
expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of association, is evident.150 
At the time of the drafting of the UDHR one of the drafters stated that it would not be necessary 
to protect human thought that was not to be given an outward expression; 
it would be unnecessary to proclaim that freedom if it were never to be given an outward expression; 
if it were intended, so to speak, only for the use of the inner man. It was necessary however to stress 
the external manifestation of creeds by which expression was given to beliefs.151 
This statement seems to suggest that the protection of the forum internum is actually not what 
has been seen as central to the protection given by this human right. However, the nucleus of 
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the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion cannot be derogated from, even in time 
of public emergency. This indicates a fundamental character of the right.152 Article 18 ICCPR, 
further, distinguishes the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief from the freedom 
to manifest religion or belief. Limitations are not permitted to the freedom of thought and 
conscience or to the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief. The freedom to manifest 
religion or belief can, however, be subject to limitations that are “prescribed by law and are 
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others”.153 The absolute character of the freedom of what was called the inner state 
of mind was also stressed during the drafting of the UDHR.154 At the drafting of the ICCPR, it 
was agreed that no restrictions of legal character can be imposed on “man's inner thought or 
moral consciousness, or his attitude towards the universe or its creator; only external 
manifestations of religion or belief might be subject to legitimate limitations”.155 This implies 
that protection of what has been called the forum internum should be seen as central and 
absolute. 
The committee has, further, pointed out that the right includes protection that means that no one 
shall be compelled to reveal thoughts or adherence to a certain religion or belief.156 
Moreover, the predominant focus of the right has been interpreted to be the right to freedom of 
religion.157 In 1993, the Human Rights Committee adopted the General comment No. 22:  
Article 18 (Freedom of thought, conscience or religion) that was supposed to clarify the 
meaning of the right. The Human Rights Committee stated, that it wished to draw attention to 
the fact that freedom of thought and freedom of conscience are protected equally with freedom 
of religion and belief.158 The importance of the freedom of thought in relation to the freedom 
of religion was also discussed during the drafting of UDHR.159 The delegation from Uruguay 
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did, for example, put forward two observations. “First, he thought that it laid too much stress 
on religious freedom; actually, and especially at that very time, freedom of thought should be 
extended particularly to the realms of politics and science.”160  
UDHR explicitly expresses protection of the freedom to change one’s religion or belief as well 
as to publicly manifest religion or belief. This protection is not explicitly expressed in 
connection to freedom of thought and conscience. However, it is not clear what is included in 
the term belief and to what extent that term could include the complexity of human cognition. 
The terms are not defined in the instruments, but it has been stated in the literature that the 
terms, religion and belief together, cover “all possible attitudes of the individual toward the 
world, toward society, and toward that which determines his fate and the destiny of the world, 
be it a divinity, some superior being or just reason and rationalism, or chance”.161 The wording 
“change religion or belief”,162 was largely discussed during the drafting of the UDHR. For 
example, the Saudia Arabia delegation pointed at the history of missionaries and efforts to 
convert human beings as a risk, present in the formulation.163 
In the ICCPR, the corresponding protection is formulated as a freedom to have or to adopt a 
religion or belief of one’s choice.164 This formulation was put forward in order to provide 
protection, both for the right to change religion and for a right against proselytizers and 
missionaries.165 The Human Rights Committee has stated that the freedom, to have or to adopt 
a religion or belief, necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief and that it thus 
includes the right to replace a current religion or belief with another, or to adopt an atheistic 
view, but also to retain one’s religion or belief. It has, further, stated that the formulation forbids 
coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief. This prohibition 
includes policies or practices that would have the same intention or effect as coercion.166 
Further, the ICCPR provides a provision that explicitly says that “no one shall be subject to 
coercion which would impair his freedom to maintain or to change his religion or belief”.167 
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During the drafting it was said that the term coercion should not be understood as “applying to 
moral or intellectual persuasion, or to any legitimate limitation of freedom to manifest one's 
religion or belief”.168 The boundary between coercion and intellectual persuasion is not further 
defined.  
The protection to “have or to adopt” in the ICCPR is provided with respect to religion or belief. 
This implies that beliefs other than religious are protected by this part of the protection.169 The 
Human Rights Committee has stated that the wording: religion or belief shall be interpreted 
broadly and that it should not be limited to traditional religions.170 The Committee has also 
stated that theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs as well as choosing not to confess to any 
belief should be included in the protection.171 The terms “belief” and “religion” are thus, in 
accordance with the comments to be broadly construed. The committee further, stated that the 
article: 
is not limited in its application to traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional 
characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional religions. The Committee therefore 
views with concern any tendency to discriminate against any religion or belief for any reason, 
including the fact that they are newly established, or represent religious minorities that may be the 
subject of hostility on the part of a predominant religious community.172  
Hence, it is clear that not only traditional religions or beliefs are protected. There are, however, 
limits to what have been seen as protected. In a case, the Committee found that the cultivation 
and worship of a narcotic drug could not be protected as a religion or belief under the right in 
ICCPR.173  
In the drafting of the ICCPR, the two terms thought, and belief were discussed with regards to 
how they relate to each other and if they were intended to be different concepts. It was said by 
one of the drafters that a distinction between the terms seemed to have been contemplated and 
that it would be desirable to clarify the meaning of the two terms. The term thought was also 
discussed in relation to the term, opinion, in article 19.174 There does, however, not seem to 
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exist any clarification of any common intent to give these different concepts any special 
meaning.  
The Human Rights committee has stated that the freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
is far-reaching and profound and that it “encompasses freedom of thought on all matters, 
personal conviction and the commitment to religion or belief, whether manifested  individually 
or in community with others”.175 This comment implies that the freedom is to be interpreted 
broadly.  
3.2.2 Freedom of opinion and expression 
Article 19  
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any 
media and regardless of frontiers. 
- Universal Declaration of Human rights176 
Article 19  
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.  
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing 
or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights177 
Freedom of opinion and expression is recognized in UDHR and ICCPR. The right at hand 
provides protection for human beings, to hold opinions without interference. Human beings 
have different opinions in all sorts of questions and the right has been described as a right for 
people to think what they like.178 Since human cognition is consisting of mental processes that, 
as it is defined in this thesis, is constituting thought and remembering, it is clear that this right 
protects some dimensions of human cognition. The right does further include a right to inform 
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oneself; to be informed and to access information. Since human cognition is consisting of 
mental processes that, as it is defined in this thesis, are processing information, this part of the 
right too is relevant with respect to a potential protection of human cognition. 
The wordings of the provisions that formulate this right are not clear as to what parts and to 
what extent human cognition is being given protection. The Human Rights Committee has 
adopted a general comment to the article. This comment is, however, very short and does not 
develop the interpretation of the wording very much. The committee briefly states that the right 
cannot be restricted and that the committee welcomes information from state parties, 
concerning the first paragraph of the article.179 In a publication, the UN writes that it is logical 
that the covenant does not permit exceptions or restrictions to the right since it is impossible to 
control what goes on in a person’s mind.180 This statement implies, on the one hand, that the 
right is important since no restrictions are permitted, but on the other hand, that the scenario, 
where “control”181 over the “mind”182 of a human being is possible, has not been considered by 
the UN.  
At the drafting of the UDHR, several delegations pointed at the importance of the right. For 
example, Mrs. Roosevelt (United States of America) stated that “no human rights were more 
fundamental than freedom of opinion and expression”.183 Another example is that “Mr. 
Corominas (Argentina) emphasized the fact that article 17 was perhaps the most important of 
the whole declaration”.184 
Mr. Corominas said that “without it the individual would be deprived of freedom of expression, 
which was his most effective weapon for defending democratic institutions and the very 
principles on which the declaration was based”.185 This statement can be interpreted as implying 
that this delegation thought the freedom of expression to be the central aspect of the article. 
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Further, the focus in the discussion of the article seems to have been on the right to freedom of 
expression. This could imply that freedom of expression was seen as the part in certain need of 
discussion and clarification, but it could also imply that it was seen as the more important part 
of the right. The delegation from Panama proposed separation between the two freedoms of 
opinion and expression.186 The delegation from the United Kingdom did, on the other hand, 
state that it considered such a separation unwise since the two ideas were inalterably linked.187 
At the drafting of the ICCPR the relation between the two freedoms was discussed again; 
it became clear that freedom of opinion and freedom of expression were not of the same character: 
the former was purely a private matter, belonging as it did to the realm of the mind, while the latter 
was a public matter, or a matter of human relationship, which should be subject to legal as well as 
moral restraint. Although it was claimed that a person was invariably conditioned or influenced by 
the world, it was generally agreed that no law could regulate his opinion and no power could dictate 
what opinion he should or should not entertain.188 
It was during the drafting of ICCPR, in contrast with the drafting of UDHR, decided that the 
covenant should treat the freedom of opinion and the freedom of expression separately.189 This 
separation of the two freedoms makes it clear that what was called the realm of the mind; i.e., 
the holding of opinions, should be protected independently of the public matter of outward 
expression. 
Another question that was discussed at the drafting of ICCPR was if there was any distinction 
between the freedom of opinion and the freedom of thought, as stated in the covenant’s article 
18. “One comment was to the effect that the words ‘thought’ and ‘opinion’, though not identical, 
were very close to each other in meaning; another that the two words were not mutually 
exclusive but complementary to each other; a third that ‘freedom to hold any opinions without 
interference’ was a truism and therefore superfluous.”190 These discussions can, however, not 
be seen as establishing a common intent to any special meaning of the words and can thus not 
be seen as giving any distinct clarification to what should be protected by the respective 
provisions. 
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4. Cognitive Liberty 
Cognitive liberty has been described as “a concept that deals with privacy and self-
determination and autonomy with respect to what is happening in human brains”.191 It has also 
been called mental self-determination.192 The concept has been argued to be of fundamental 
character since “the right and freedom to control one’s own consciousness and electrochemical 
thought processes is the necessary substrate for just about every other freedom”.193  
The right to cognitive liberty can be seen as resembling the recognized international human 
right to freedom of thought. Wrye Sententia, one of the legal scholars who coined the term 
cognitive liberty, presented it as a conceptual update to the freedom of thought. The update was 
presented as way of taking into account the contemporary context of AI influencing human life 
and the new and increasing power to monitor and manipulate cognitive functions.194 Sententia 
has, further, argued that cognitive liberty is a fundamental right to use the full spectrum of the 
mind and that the right concerns  the “ethics and legality of safeguarding one's own thought 
processes, and by necessity, one's electrochemical brain states”.195 She has also stated that 
humans and not corporate or government interests should have jurisdiction over control and 
modulation of mental processes and human brain states.196 Sententia has also stated that “the 
right and freedom to control one's own consciousness and electrochemical thought processes is 
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The concept is further seen as multi-dimensional. Three recognized interrelated dimensions are: 
 (i) the liberty to change one’s mind or to choose whether and by which means to change one’s mind; 
(ii) the protection of interventions into other minds to protect mental integrity, and (iii) the ethical 
and legal obligation to promoting cognitive liberty.198 
The concept, cognitive liberty, has been discussed mostly in connection to neuroscience and 
neurotechnology.199 My suggestion is that the concept can be relevant, in the context of this 
thesis, not only in connection to neurotechnology but also to the other kinds of AI that I have 
discussed in this thesis, which can affect, modulate or manipulate human cognition. Thus, 
similar arguments that have been put forward concerning neurotechnology can also be put 
forward concerning these other technologies, since these too, as I have argued in section 2.3, 
are affecting human cognition in new ways.  
4.1 Human rights in the contemporary context of artificial intelligence influencing 
human life or posthuman rights? 
I am in this thesis exploring what I call human rights in the contemporary context of AI 
influencing human life. I suggest that human rights can be rethought in the light of a posthuman 
understanding of how the relevant kinds of AI affect human cognition.  
Others have discussed, what has been called, posthuman rights.200 Posthuman rights have, in 
the Posthuman Glossary, been described as “[s]uch a praxis of rights as posthuman celebrates 
the creation of a new thinking and praxis of rights, one which is cut loose from the ordered and 
majoritarian thinking of rights in neoliberal modernity. Posthuman rights embody the claims of 
transversal assemblages of individuals who do not see a binary cut between thought and action, 
life and death, environment and humanity, or animality and humanity”.201 Posthuman rights can 
be and have been criticized. It has been said that individuals understood according to a 
posthuman scheme do not share a common ontology and that they might, therefore, not share a 
 
198 Ienca, Marcello & Roberto Andorno, “Towards New Human Rights in the Age of Neuroscience and 
Neurotechnology.”, p. 10-11. 
199 C.f., e.g. Wrye, Sententia, “Neuroethical Considerations: Cognitive Liberty and Converging Technologies for 
Improving Human Cognition.”, In its whole. & C.f., e.g. Ienca, Marcello & Roberto Andorno, “Towards New 
Human Rights in the Age of Neuroscience and Neurotechnology.”, Passim. 
200 See, e.g. Hanafin, Patrick, “Posthuman rights, a micropolitics of”, in Braidotti, Rosi, & Hlavajova, Maria, 
(ed.) Posthuman Glossary (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2018) [Electronic] Available: ProQuest Ebook 
Central, https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/lib/gu/reader.action?docID=5226228 (Last 
accessed: 1/12-2019), p.352-355. 
201 Hanafin, Patrick, “Posthuman rights, a micropolitics of”, p. 354-355 & C.f. Braidotti, Rosi, The Posthuman, 
p. 8 & 167. 
 46 
common set of human rights. Posthuman rights embody the claims of assemblages of 
individuals who do not see a binary cut between thought and action, life and death, environment 
and humanity, or animality and humanity, assemblages of individuals which have been 
described as not sharing a common ontology. Ideas connecting to posthuman understandings 
and posthuman rights have also been claimed to be a threat to democracy which depends on 
shared biological and cultural foundations as a ground for human equality.  
The introduction of AI that is affecting human cognition can, as discussed in section 2.3, be 
seen as altering human vulnerability and could, therefore, possibly be seen as posing a risk to 
the condition comprising a shared common set of human rights. With regards to the problem, 
of protection of human cognition in a time where AI is affecting human life, posed in this thesis, 
existential risks can, therefore, arise from the technological advancements. AI can be described 
as altering human vulnerability and could, therefore, also be described as challenging the idea 
of a shared human ontology.  
As discussed in section 2.3, Hayles argues that there are narratives concerning AI and humans 
that express a fear of loss of humanity and loss of control, but also fear of dissolution of the 
human self. 202 She, further, argues that by disentangling assumptions about the human as an 
independent entity, the possibility for the human to live in close connection with other life forms 
renders available.203 In light of this idea, I suggest that understanding human cognition as 
entangled with AI, renders such a possibility available. Human cognition, a human function 
that is thought to have evolved as a way of controlling action, must, be seen as important for 
human beings in general and could, therefore, be considered to be common. Since human 
cognition could be considered to be common, I suggest that acknowledging that there is a 
convergence of human cognition and AI instead of a dissolution of the human self, can help 
maintain an understanding of a common human ontology and, therefore, help manage 
existential risks that can arise from the technological advancements. I, therefore, suggest that 
the altered human vulnerability that emerges when viewing human cognition as entangled with 
the relevant kinds of AI, as discussed in section 2.3, does not pose a risk to the condition of a 
shared common set of human rights. I do rather, suggest that it can be possible to manage 
existential risks that can arise from technological advancements, with regards to the problem 
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posed in this thesis, by acknowledging that there is a convergence of human cognition and AI. 
I, therefore, suggest that rethinking human rights in light of a posthuman understanding of how 
the relevant kinds of AI affect human cognition could help manage such risks. By rethinking 
human rights in this context my suggestion is, therefore, that human rights can maintain a 
desirable function in human society. 
4.2 International human rights in the contemporary context of artificial intelligence 
influencing human life  
Radical developments in technology put pressure on the legal system to accommodate new 
knowledge about how human cognition works.204 As Wrye Sententia, puts it: 
What new forms of law will be necessary to cope with rapid advances in cognitive intervention and 
monitoring? What common concepts will require re‐evaluation based on new models in our 
understanding of the brain and its functional properties? How will these emerging technologies, with 
an enhanced capacity to monitor and control cognitive function, be restricted or applied? How will 
the law cope with discoveries and revelations from brain science that call for a revision of some of 
its most basic core assumptions of human autonomy and freedom? These questions, and others like 
them, point to areas by which our shared cultural systems may be woefully unprepared to incorporate 
coming revolutions in new material ways of thinking about thinking.205 
In, for example, criminal law, attention is being devoted to neurotechnological applications. 
However, little focus has been directed to the implications for human rights law.206 This is 
applicable to the dimensions of AI discussed in this text in general. The development and 
deployment of AI and its impact does not stop at national borders. Hence, global solutions are 
required for the global challenges and risks posed by AI.207 The implications for human rights 
law is, therefore, of particular interest, since the universal nature of human rights law could be 
suitable for providing a solid foundation for the emerging jurisprudence of technology.208  
Moreover, in the development of AI, ethical codes for this development have been presented. 
These codes do often advocate respect for human rights. To give some examples, the future of 
life institute, an organization working to ensure that AI is developed in a way that is beneficial 
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to humans,209 includes a principle of respect for fundamental human rights in their code of 
ethics.210 It is formulated as follows: “AI systems should be designed and operated so as to be 
compatible with ideals of human dignity, rights, freedoms, and cultural diversity.”211 United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has, in the UNESCO 
Courier, published that AI must be ensured to serve humanity with respect to human dignity 
and human rights.212 Google has written, concerning its principles regarding AI, that AI will 
not be designed or deployed in the area of “[t]echnologies whose purpose contravenes widely 
accepted principles of international law and human rights”.213 The European Commission for 
the efficiency of justice has included a principle of respect for human rights in the European 
Ethical Charter on the use of AI in judicial systems and their environment.214 The European 
Commission has also set up the High-level expert group on AI which have published ethics 
guidelines for trustworthy AI where it is stated that “ [i]t is through Trustworthy AI that we, as 
European citizens, will seek to reap its benefits in a way that is aligned with our foundational 
values of respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law”.215 This shows an existing 
focus within ethical frameworks in the field of AI, on developing AI in a way that is aligned 
with respect for human rights. Human rights can thus provide promising foundations for 
recognizing abstract ethical principles and values for the context of AI.216 
4.2.1 Need to rethink the protection of human cognition given by the international human 
rights framework in the contemporary context of artificial intelligence influencing 
human life  
The history of human rights can, as discussed above in section 3.1.1, be seen as an ongoing one. 
Human rights can, therefore, not be seen as definitive and should thus be rethought when 
 
209 Future of life institute, “Who we are”, https://futureoflife.org/team/ (Last accessed: 16/12-2019). 
210 More ethical codes on artificial intelligence can be found on: Algorithmwatch, “AI Ethics Guidelines Global 
Inventory”, https://algorithmwatch.org/en/project/ai-ethics-guidelines-global-inventory/ (Last accessed: 11/12-
2019). 
211 Future of life institute, “Asilomar AI Principles”, https://futureoflife.org/ai-principles/?cn-reloaded=1 (Last 
accessed: 24/10-2019). 
212 UNESCO. “Artificial intelligence: the promises and the threats”, 
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000265211 (Last accessed: 24/11-2019). 
213 Google, “AI at Google: our principles”, https://www.blog.google/technology/ai/ai-principles/ (Last accessed: 
31/10-2019). 
214 EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE, “European ethical Charter on the use 
of Artificial Intelligence in judicial systems and their environment”,  
https://rm.coe.int/ethical-charter-en-for-publication-4-december-2018/16808f699c (Last accessed: 24/10-2019). 
215 The EC High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, AI HLEG, 2019, “Ethics Guidance for 
Trustworthy AI”, p. 4. 
216 C.f. The EC High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, AI HLEG, 2019, “Ethics Guidance for 
Trustworthy AI”, p. 9. 
 49 
needed, in a new context. Hayles suggests that “[w]hatever our future, it will almost certainly 
include human interventions in biological processes, which means that ‘human nature’ will at 
least in part be what humans decide it should be”.217 Similarly, AI is created by human beings 
which means that humans will, at least in part, be part in deciding the future of humans and AI. 
Hayles states that “[i]t is likely that our future will be increasingly entwined with intelligent 
machines, but this only deepens and extends the necessity for principled debate, for their futures 
too cannot be envisioned apart from the primary concern for ethics that should drive these 
discussions”.218 As discussed in section 2.3, AI is affecting human cognition and it can be 
argued that human cognition is increasingly entwined with AI. This does, in line with Hayles’s 
statement, deepen and extend the necessity for an initiated debate, since the future of AI cannot 
be envisioned as separated from ethical concerns. Discussions about the future of human rights, 
AI and human cognition can, in line with these thoughts, be argued to be necessary.  
As I have discussed in section 2.3, AI is affecting human cognition in ways that have not been 
possible before the introduction of AI. The evolved way of processing information is, in the 
contemporary context of artificial intelligence influencing human life, as discussed in section 
2.3, vulnerable to AI in personalization algorithms and augmented reality technology filtering 
information and to the possibility of revealing the content of cognition without the human’s 
consent. Since human cognition is, as presented in section 2.1, thought to have evolved as a 
way of controlling action and, thus, as a way of processing information, so that the human 
being can respond to what is perceived,219 protection of human cognition must be seen as 
necessary for humans to be agents. Protection of human cognition must, therefore, be seen as 
a common human interest that is vulnerable and necessary for humans to be agents. Since the 
protection of common human interests that are vulnerable and necessary for humans to be 
agents can be seen as common human interests that should be protected by human rights, I 
further suggest that international human rights need to be rethought in light of the 
contemporary context of artificial intelligence influencing human life. 
Such a rethinking of international human rights, to protect human cognition in the contemporary 
context of AI influencing human life, needs to be justified in the human rights system.220 A 
moral justification put forward for human rights is generally equality, or, basic moral equality. 
 
217 Hayles, N. Katherine, “Computing the Human.”, p. 133. 
218 Hayles, N. Katherine, “Computing the Human.”, p. 148. 
219 See Glass, Arnold Lewis, Cognition, p. 2. 
220 See section 3.1.2. 
 50 
Human rights can be seen as one phenomenon that constitutes human beings’ equal moral 
status. Human rights can, in line with this thought, protect interests that can give rise to 
entitlements that are constitutive of equal moral status.221 The discussed protection is 
concerning a human function that is thought to have evolved as a way of controlling action, a 
function that must be seen as important for human beings in general and common to humans. 
Protection of human cognition as a common human interest that is vulnerable and necessary for 
humans to be agents could, thus, be constitutive for the idea that all persons should be seen as 
having the same moral worth and could, therefore, be the basis for mutual moral claim. I, 
therefore, suggest that protection of human cognition as a common human interest that is 
vulnerable and necessary for humans to be agents can give rise to entitlements that are 
constitutive of equal moral status. Dignity, as a part of the moral justification equality, can be 
formulated as the possession of personhood and the capacity for rational and moral agency.222 
Since human cognition is thought to be a function evolved to control action and a way of 
processing information it can be seen as crucial to the human capacity for rational and moral 
agency. I, therefore, suggest that protection of human cognition as a common human interest 
that is vulnerable and necessary for humans to be agents is necessary to protect human dignity. 
4.3 Rethinking of recognized human rights in the contemporary context of artificial 
intelligence influencing human life 
To understand if the international human rights framework is elastic enough to provide 
protection by rethinking of already recognized rights I will in this section, in accordance with 
rules of interpretation, analyse how and if the relevant recognized rights can be interpreted to 
accommodate protection of human cognition in the contemporary context of AI influencing 
human life.  
As discussed in section 3.1.3, the rules of interpretation that can be found in VCLT is considered 
to be customary law, applicable to human rights law. The articles in VCLT are not considered 
to be step-by-step formulas for interpretation but rather indications of elements that should be 
taken into consideration.223 The rules of interpretation that can be relevant for this context will, 
therefore, be taken into consideration when analysing if the recognized rights can accommodate 
protection of the human cognition in the contemporary context of AI influencing human life. 
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Further, other interpretative tools that are used in the interpretation of international human 
rights, will be taken into consideration.  
The terms in the two relevant rights are abstract concepts. With this in mind, it can be difficult 
to find an acceptable ordinary meaning of the right.224 Human rights are often general, vague 
and subjective.225 These rights can be described with those terms and it is therefore motivated 
to take an expansive attitude towards the interpretation of the right.226 In line with this, the 
Human Rights Committee also has implied that the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion is to be interpreted broadly.227 Since it is generally acknowledged that a more expansive 
attitude towards interpretation is needed for human rights, I will approach the interpretation of 
the rights with an expansive attitude.228 
The ordinary meaning should according to VCLT be given in the context. Further, the ordinary 
meaning of a term develops over time.229 The ordinary meaning of the terms in the rights should, 
therefore, be interpreted in the contemporary context of AI influencing human life. Further, in 
accordance with the interpretative tool evolutive interpretation, which UN human rights bodies 
have relied upon, the rights can be interpreted in light of present-day conditions.230 Present-day 
conditions are, as suggested in this thesis, altering common human vulnerability. The altered 
common human vulnerability should, therefore, be taken into account when interpreting the 
rights. 
VCLT, further, provides that if it can be established that the parties intended a special meaning 
to a term this should be the meaning given to the term in interpretation.231 The intentions of the 
parties are, therefore, an important factor for interpretation. The documents from the drafting 
of the ICCPR and UDHR are therefore important sources of information in this interpretation 
of the rights. Given the number of parties to the UDHR and the ICCPR, it can, however, be 
difficult to find common intentions.232 
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4.3.1 Freedom of thought, conscience and religion in the contemporary context of artificial 
intelligence influencing human life  
Article 31(1) VCLT states that interpretation shall be made in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning of a provision.233 The freedom of thought, conscience and religion is, by the wording 
of the provisions where this right is recognized, connected to human cognition.234 Human 
cognition is, as it is defined in this thesis, mental processes, processing information, that is 
constituting thinking and remembering. The wording of the articles, in which the right is 
recognized does, therefore, entail a connection between the right to freedom of thought and 
human cognition. Further, the freedom of religion and belief can also be seen as connected to 
human cognition since having, and adopting a religion or belief includes mental processes, 
processing information. However, it is not clear what aspects of human cognition that is 
protected by the right. 
The documentations from the discussions of the drafting of the provisions that recognize the 
right at hand, together with the wording of the provisions in their entirety, show a tendency to 
focus on the outward expression of thoughts and conscience. 235 However, the tendency is not 
strong enough to established that such meaning of the wording was the common intent of the 
parties. Further AI is, as discussed in section 2.3, entailing possibilities to affect human 
cognition in new ways. I suggest that this bring the so-called nucleus of the right into a situation 
where human cognition can possibly be affected in other ways than imagined at the time of the 
drafting of the right. I therefore argue that the so-called nucleus of the right can no longer be 
seen as so unproblematic as it was seen to be at the time of the drafting. A focus on the outward 
expression of thoughts and conscience can, therefore, reasonably not be given to the provision 
when interpreted in light of present-day conditions. The freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion cannot be derogated from and have been described as fundamental.236 This, further, 
suggests that the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion should enjoy broad 
protection. 
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It has been suggested that the focus of the right is the freedom of religion. As discussed in 
section 3.2.1, it has, though, also been argued that the different parts of the right should be given 
equal weight. The right should, thus, not be interpreted to provide weaker protection concerning 
freedom of thought and conscience.  
The ICCPR provides a prohibition of coercion which would impair freedom to maintain or 
change religion or belief.237 The term coercion has been interpreted as not “applying to moral 
or intellectual persuasion”.238 Since the boundary between coercion and persuasion is not 
further defined it is, however, difficult to decide if the ways in which AI is affecting human 
cognition could be seen as coercion prohibited by the right or persuasion interpreted to be in 
accordance with the right. Interpreted in light of present-day conditions in which human beings, 
as discussed in section 2.3.2, can be seen as vulnerable to the contemporary possibility to 
constantly and unconsciously reveal the content of cognition, without the consent of the human 
being, some of the ways in which AI is affecting human cognition could perhaps be argued to 
be coercion. This interpretation of the right appears, however, to be rather far-fetched and as 
stretching the interpretation process a bit too far. Further, such protection against coercion is 
only recognized concerning religion and belief and not concerning thought and conscience, 
even though it has been stated that the term belief shall be interpreted broadly.239  
Moreover, the ordinary meaning should be given in light of the object and purpose of the 
provisions. The specific nature of human rights may, in fact, lead to enhanced importance of 
the object and the purpose of the treaty while the importance of the text might be reduced.240 
A teleological approach to interpretation has in line with this been adopted in human rights 
law. Hence, much weight is to be given to preambles of treaties and declarations. The 
preamble of the UDHR states that the declaration should be a common standard for all 
peoples and nations.241 It further proclaims that “the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world”.242 The preamble of the ICCPR is, also, mentioning dignity and 
equality.243 This implies that the purpose and the object of the documents are dignity and 
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equality. The object and purpose of the documents can thus be argued to be, to foster 
freedom, justice, and peace through protecting human dignity and equal rights of all human 
beings. Since the discussed protection is regarding a human function that is thought to have 
evolved as a way of controlling action, a function that must be seen as important for human 
beings in general, protection of human cognition as a common human interest that is 
vulnerable and necessary for humans to be agents could be constitutive for the idea that all 
persons should be seen as having the same moral worth and could, therefore, be the basis for 
mutual moral claim. I, therefore, suggest that protection of human cognition as a common 
human interest that is vulnerable and necessary for humans to be agents can give rise to 
entitlements that are constitutive of equal moral status. Further, since human cognition is 
thought to be a function evolved to control action and a way of processing information it can 
be seen as crucial to the human capacity for rational and moral agency. I, therefore, suggest 
that protection of human cognition as a common human interest that is vulnerable and 
necessary for humans to be agents is necessary to protect human dignity. The right could, 
therefore, in light of the object and purpose of the documents be interpreted to protect human 
cognition in the contemporary context of artificial intelligence influencing human life. 
When considering the so-called ‘pro homine’ or human-centred approach to human rights, it 
can be argued that it is central to protect human cognition against non-humans such as AI.  
Since the Human Rights Committee has pointed out that the right to thought and religion 
includes protection against being compelled to reveal one’s thoughts and/or adherence to a 
certain religion or belief, this right can be interpreted to accommodate protection of some parts 
of human cognition as a common human interest that is vulnerable and necessary for humans 
to be agents, such as protection against AI in neurotechnology that can reveal content of human 
cognition.244 
Based on these analyses this human right can possibly be interpreted to accommodate protection 
of some parts of human cognition. I do, however, suggest that the wording of the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion implies that the right is protecting the what in 
cognition and not the how. It is the thought, conscience and religion that is protected and, for 
example, not how to think. The right does, however, include that no one shall be subject to 
coercion which would impair freedom to have or adopt religion or belief. This part of the right 
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can be seen as protecting the how in cognition. This part of the provision mentions religion and 
belief but not conscience or thought. The term belief shall be interpreted broadly, but the fact 
that belief and thought are separated does, nevertheless, imply that there is a difference between 
the two concepts. This possible protection of the how can therefore not be interpreted to include 
thought and conscience.  
When AI is affecting human cognition, it is affecting how human beings think, perceive, 
remember and understand, it is affecting the how in human cognition. Based on these reflections 
and analyses, I argue that even though it is motivated to interpret the right broadly and in light 
of the contemporary context of AI influencing human life, an interpretation that would allow 
the right to accommodate adequate protection of human cognition in this context is, in line with 
the rules of interpretation, not achievable.  
4.3.2 Freedom of opinion and expression in the contemporary context of artificial intelligence 
influencing human life  
Article 31(1) VCLT states that interpretation shall be made in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning of a provision.245 Human cognition is, as it is defined in this thesis, mental processes 
that are constituting thinking and remembering. Human beings have different opinions in all 
sorts of questions and this right has been described as a right for people to think what they 
like.246 Thus, the wording of the articles, in which the right is recognized entails a connection 
between the right and human cognition.247 However, it is not clear what aspects of human 
cognition is protected. 
Further, the right includes a right to inform oneself, to be informed and to access information.248 
Since human cognition, as it is defined in this thesis, is mental processes, processing 
information, and since I suggest that humans are vulnerable, when AI in personalization 
algorithms and augmented reality technology is filtering information, this part of the right could 
be protecting parts of human cognition in the contemporary context of AI influencing human 
life. However, the right to information oneself is, in ICCPR, recognized as included in the 
freedom of expression and not in the freedom of opinion.249 This could be seen as implying that 
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the freedom to inform oneself is protected as a part of the freedom to expression and not as a 
part of the freedom to opinion.  
The UN statement which is discussed in section 3.2.2, indicates that a scenario, where “control” 
over the “mind” of a human being is possible, has not been considered by the UN. This could 
suggest that the common intent of the parties is not to give the provision the meaning that it 
should protect the human cognition from “control”.250 However, when interpreting the 
provision in light of present-day conditions, in which AI has enabled new ways of affecting 
human cognition it can be argued that protection of human cognition from being affected in 
certain ways that could be categorized as “control” could be seen as included in the right.  
Further, the discussions seen in documents from the drafting of the ICCPR seem to focus on 
the right to freedom of expression.251 It is, however, not clear if the reason for this was that 
freedom of expression was seen as more important or, as more in need of discussion for 
clarification. Therefore, any common intent, to give the wording of the provision any special 
meaning, in this regard, cannot be established. Moreover, the ICCPR treats freedom of opinion 
separately from freedom of expression.252 Freedom of opinion is therefore, clearly, protected 
independently from freedom of expression. This separation shows that, what was called, the 
realm of the mind in the drafting of the convention should be protected, independent of what 
was called the public matter of outward expression. 
Based on these analyses this human right can possibly be interpreted to accommodate protection 
of some parts of human cognition. The wording of the right does, however, show that it is the 
holding of an opinion that is protected. This implies that it is not the mental process of acquiring 
or changing an opinion that is protected. It is, therefore, reasonable to interpret the right as 
protecting the what in opinion but not the how. When AI is affecting human cognition, it is 
affecting how human beings think, perceive, remember and understand, it is affecting the how 
in human cognition. I do, therefore, argue that even though it is motivated to interpret the right 
broadly, an interpretation that would allow the right to accommodate adequate protection of 
human cognition in the contemporary context of AI influencing human life is, in line with the 
rules of interpretation, not achievable.  
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The right does, however, also include a right to inform oneself. The right could, therefore, be 
seen as protecting some relevant aspects of human cognition. The wording of that part of the 
right implies that it is the right to seek, receive and impart information that is protected. This 
implies that it is not access to ways of seeking, receiving and imparting of information that is 
protected. It is, therefore, also in this part, reasonable to interpret the right as protecting the 
what, but not the how in cognition. I, therefore, suggest that this part of the right can only protect 
part of human cognition in the contemporary context of AI influencing human life. 
4.3.3 Protection of human cognition in the contemporary context of artificial intelligence 
influencing human life by recognized human rights 
The terms thought, belief and opinion and the question of how they relate to each other have 
been discussed, for example, at the drafting of the ICCPR.253 However, there are, to my 
knowledge, no clarifications of any common intent of how the terms relate to each other. In 
accordance with the interpretative tool object and purpose test, the rights can be interpreted 
expansively to ensure that the provisions of the treaty have an independent or non-superfluous 
meaning. 254 When interpreting the terms to ensure that the provisions of the documents have 
an independent and non-superfluous meaning the terms can, together with the two terms 
religion and belief, protect a broad spectrum of human cognition. 
Even though the recognized rights can be interpreted to accommodate protection of parts of the 
human cognition in the contemporary context of AI influencing human life, I suggest that the 
wording of the rights imply that they cannot be interpreted so they can accommodate the how 
in cognition, such as the freedom of how to think. When AI is affecting human cognition, it is 
affecting how human beings think, perceive, remember and understand, it is affecting the how 
in human cognition. I do, therefore, suggest that the international human rights framework 
cannot be seen as elastic enough to provide protection by rethinking of already recognized 
rights. 
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4.4 Recognition of new human rights in the contemporary context of artificial 
intelligence influencing human life 
When discussing recognition of new human rights, it is relevant to once again point out that the 
history of human rights can be seen as ongoing.255 Human rights can thus not be seen as 
definitive, and recognition of new rights can, therefore, be made when it is necessary.  
When new rights are considered for recognition, an objection commonly raised is that it can 
lead to rights inflation, which has been described as the tendency to label everything “that is 
morally desirable as a ‘human right’”.256   
The international law scholar Philip Alston has formulated a justificatory test to manage this 
risk of rights inflation. He framed a list of criteria, that a given claim should satisfy in order to 
qualify as an international human right, the proposed new human right should, “reflect a 
fundamentally important social value”257; “be relevant, inevitably to varying degrees, 
throughout a world of diverse value systems”258; “be eligible for recognition on the grounds 
that it is an interpretation of UN charter obligations”259; “be consistent, but not merely 
repetitive, of the existing body of international human rights law”260; “be capable of achieving 
a very high degree of international consensus”261; “be compatible or at least not clearly 
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incompatible with the general practice of states”262; and ‘be sufficiently precise as to give rise 
to identifiable rights and obligations”.263 
Another justificatory test that has been proposed is formulated as follows;  
it could be required that a proposed human right not only deal with some very important good but 
also respond to a common and serious threat to that good, impose burdens on the addressees that are 
justifiable and no larger than necessary, and be feasible in most of the world's countries.264 
To understand if the suggested new right, cognitive liberty, could lead to rights inflation or if it 
can be justified as a new right in the international human rights framework, I am, in the 
following section 4.4.1, performing these two tests. 
4.4.1 Cognitive liberty as a new right in the contemporary context of artificial intelligence 
influencing human life 
According to the first justificatory test, the following criteria need to be met for the right to be 
justified:  
1. it should reflect a fundamentally important social value 
2. it should be relevant, inevitably to varying degrees, throughout a world of diverse value 
systems 
3. it should be eligible for recognition on the grounds that it is an interpretation of UN 
charter obligations, a reflection of customary law rules or a formulation that is 
declaratory of general principles of law 
4. it should be consistent, but not merely repetitive, of the existing body of international 
human rights law 
5. it should be capable of achieving a very high degree of international consensus 
6. it should be compatible or at least not clearly incompatible with the general practice of 
states 
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7. it should be sufficiently precise as to give rise to identifiable rights and obligations.265   
Regarding the first criteria, it has been argued that;  
cognitive life, although in various forms and degrees, is inherent in all human beings, cognitive 
liberty is consistent with a definition of human rights as inalienable fundamentals rights ‘to which a 
person is inherently entitled simply because she or he is a human being’[…] regardless of their 
nation, location, language, religion, ethnic origin or any other status.266  
Since human cognition, in the contemporary context of AI influencing human life, is exposed 
to new ways of being affected, I suggest, as discussed in section 2.3 and 4.2.1, that protection 
of human cognition must be seen as a common human interest that is vulnerable and necessary 
for humans to be agents. Protecting common human interests that are vulnerable and necessary 
for humans to be agents can, as discussed in section 3.1.2, be seen as a common human interest 
that should be protected by human rights. I do, thus, suggest that protection of human cognition 
in the contemporary context of AI influencing human life can be seen as a fundamentally 
important social value. 
Regarding the second criteria, it can be argued that, since human cognition is thought to be a 
function evolved to control action and process information, it is an important function to human 
being’s in general. Since human cognition is exposed to new ways of being affected, I suggest, 
as discussed in section 2.3 and 4.2.1, that protection of human cognition must be seen as a 
common human interest that is vulnerable and necessary for humans to be agents. Protection of 
human cognition could, thus, be relevant throughout a world of diverse value systems. 
Regarding the third criteria, it can be argued that the right can be seen as an interpretation of 
UN charter obligations. Article 2(2) in the UN charter states that the organization and the 
members shall act in accordance with the principle that “[a]ll Members shall settle their 
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, 
and justice, are not endangered”.267 This, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article 1. One of 
which states that the purposes of the United Nations are “[t]o develop friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and 
 
265 Alston, Philip. “Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control.”, p. 607 & See also Ienca, 
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to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”.268 A UN charter obligation 
can, therefore, be argued to be for the organization and the members to respect the inherent 
dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family, to preserve 
international peace and security, and justice. This obligation can also be seen as reflected in the 
preamble of the UDHR, in the statement “the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in 
the world”.269 Since I, as discussed in section 4.2.1, suggest that protection of cognitive liberty 
can be justified by the justifications equality and dignity, I further suggest that the right can be 
seen as an interpretation of UN charter obligations. 
Regarding the fourth criteria, it has been argued that “[b]eing the neurocognitive substrate of 
all other liberties, cognitive liberty cannot be reduced to existing rights, hence [it] is immune to 
the risk of rights inflation”.270 It has, further, been argued that “its integration into the human 
rights framework would enable the protection of constitutive features of human beings that are 
not being entirely protected by existing rights”.271 In the discussions in section 4.3, regarding 
already recognized rights, I suggest that the recognized rights cannot be interpreted as 
accommodating protection of the how in human cognition. Since cognitive liberty, as a new 
human right, can be discussed as the right and freedom to control one’s consciousness and 
electrochemical thought processes, the new right could protect the how in human cognition. It 
can, therefore, not be seen as merely repetitive of existing rights. The nature of cognitive liberty 
can, further, be seen as consistent with the existing body of international human rights law, 
since it would be protecting what can be argued to be a common human interest that is 
vulnerable and necessary for humans to be agents. 
Regarding the fifth criteria, it is difficult to confidently decide how an international consensus 
would emerge. However, the fact that cognition is a function that can be seen as important for 
human beings in general, and that has been described as inherent in all human beings regardless 
of nation or location, religion or ethnicity makes it possible that protection of cognitive liberty 
would be capable of drawing international consensus.272 However, the described common 
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human vulnerability is an issue that can be politically and religiously controversial, since the 
so-called inner sphere of a human being can be and has been seen as outside the scope of legal 
regulation. This implies that it might be difficult to achieve a high degree of international 
consensus. Nonetheless, when studying ethical codes developed to handle AI, by different 
actors from different locations in the world, some kind of international consensus regarding the 
view that AI needs to be regulated in terms of how it is affecting human beings and human 
dignity can be seen.273 It is, therefore, possible that a high degree of international consensus 
could be achieved. 
Regarding the sixth criteria, it can be argued that, since the international community has agreed 
upon protecting human thought and opinion, that as discussed in section 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 4.3.1 and 
4.3.2 can be connected to human cognition, it cannot be seen as incompatible with general 
practices of states to protect human cognition to some degree. Further, the possibility to affect 
the how in human cognition can be seen as a new phenomenon.274 It is, therefore, not likely that 
general practices of states have developed in such a way that protection of this part of human 
cognition would be incompatible with the general practice of states.  
Regarding the last criteria, it can be argued that cognitive liberty could give rise to an 
identifiable right to choose how to think. To be able to choose how to think it is necessary to be 
informed about possible ways of how to think and to not be forced into certain ways of how to 
think. This could, therefore, give rise to an identifiable obligation to inform about deployment 
of certain kinds of AI, in adequate ways, and in some instances to refrain from deploying certain 
kinds of AI. The suggested dimensions of the right, “(i) the liberty to change one’s mind or to 
choose whether and by which means to change one’s mind; (ii) the protection of interventions 
into other minds to protect mental integrity, and (iii) the ethical and legal obligation to 
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promoting cognitive liberty”, 275 further shows identifiable rights that can be derived from the 
right.  
According to the second justificatory test, the following criteria need to be met for a right to be 
justified:  
1. it should deal with some very important good  
2. it should respond to a common and serious threat to that good  
3. it should impose burdens on the addressees that are justifiable and no larger than 
necessary 
4. it should be feasible in most of the world´s countries.276  
Regarding the first criteria, it can be argued that, since human cognition is thought to have 
evolved to control action and process information it is fundamental for the function of the 
human being. Protecting the human cognition can, therefore, be seen to be a very important 
good.277  
Regarding the second criteria, I suggest, as discussed in section 2.3.2, that since AI can reveal 
parts of the content of human cognition without the human’s consent and is filtering 
information, the considered kinds of AI affect human cognition in new ways that makes human 
cognition vulnerable. This implies that there is a serious threat to human cognition. Since 
human cognition is an important function to humans in general, 278 this threat is common to 
humans.  
Regarding the third criteria, human cognition is thought to have evolved to control action and 
process information and is thus fundamental for the function of the human being.279 This 
important function is, as discussed in section 2.3.2, vulnerable to AI in personalization 
algorithms and augmented reality technology filtering information and to the possibility of 
revealing the content of cognition without the human’s consent. It can, thus, be argued that it 
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can be justifiable to impose the burden to inform of and possibly, in some instances, to refrain 
from the deployment of certain kinds of AI, that affects human cognition in certain ways.  
Regarding the last criteria, I suggest, as discussed in section 4.2.1, that protection of human 
cognition can be seen as a common human interest that is vulnerable and necessary for humans 
to be agents. Human cognition is, further, a function that should be seen as important for human 
beings in general, and that has been described as inherent in all human beings, regardless of 
nation or location, religion or ethnicity.280  Protection of human cognition in the contemporary 
context of AI influencing human life can, therefore, be relevant throughout a world of diverse 
value systems.  
These justificatory tests show that it could be possible to justify cognitive liberty as a new 
human right and that the international human rights framework could, therefore, possibly be 
elastic enough to provide protection of human cognition in the contemporary context of AI 
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5. Further and Summarizing Analysis and Conclusions 
In the contemporary context of artificial intelligence influencing human life, human cognition 
is connected with AI. As Hayles argues, there are narratives concerning AI and humans that 
express fear of loss of humanity and fear of dissolution of the human self.281 By disentangling 
assumptions about the human as an independent entity, the possibility for the human to live in 
close connection with other life forms renders available. 282 In light of this idea, I suggest that 
by understanding human cognition as entangled with AI, such a possibility can be made 
available. Such an understanding can help us understand human cognition in the contemporary 
context of artificial intelligence influencing human life. Human cognition is common to humans 
and understanding human cognition in this new context can, thus, maintain an understanding 
of humans, entangled with AI instead of dissolved.  
To understand humans as entangled with AI it is helpful to understand what AI does. To 
understand what AI does we can based on Latour’s general descriptive rule discussed in section 
2.3, imagine what other humans or other nonhumans would have to do if the relevant kinds of 
AI were not present. 283 Based on such analysis it can be understood that AI in personalization 
algorithms and augmented reality technology is shaping the flow of information and is deciding 
what information, the human being is presented with. It can be understood that AI in the 
discussed kinds of neurotechnology is revealing the content of human cognition. It can, further, 
be understood that it is likely that it, in some instances, does this through coercion or force. 
Human cognition is, thus, affected in the encounter with AI. As discussed in section 2.3, Latour 
argues that technologies can shape the decisions humans make.284 As discussed in section 2.2, 
AI in personalization algorithms and augmented reality technologies, prioritize and present 
information in a particular order and the selection of information a human being gets to see is, 
therefore, affected. AI can thus be seen as shaping a human being's perception, experience, 
existence, and action. 285 It can be seen as persuading, facilitating and enabling particular human 
cognitive processes actions and attitudes. Since AI is also affecting which information a human 
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being doesn’t get to see, it is also constraining, discouraging and inhibiting other cognitive 
processes.  
Since human beings have been described as biologically vulnerable as embodied agents,286 
changes to embodiment must have implications for human vulnerability.287 The medium for 
human information processing, and human cognition, is thought to be the nervous system that 
consists of the brain the peripheral nervous system, and the spinal cord.288 When the human 
being and human cognition is being increasingly entangled with AI this can, therefore, alter 
human vulnerability. As discussed in section 2.3.2, human cognition can be seen as vulnerable 
to AI in personalization algorithms and augmented reality technology filtering information, and 
to the possibility of revealing the content of human cognition without the human’s consent. 
Human vulnerability can be seen as altered by the condition that human cognition is now 
increasingly entangled with AI and exposed to these new ways of being affected. The 
introduction of these kinds of AI is, further, making human cognition vulnerable in new ways.  
The possibilities of monitoring and affecting human cognition enabled by the introduction of 
AI have not been possible before this introduction. When AI is affecting human cognition in 
the discussed ways it is, as discussed in section 2.3.2, changing how human beings think, 
perceive, remember and understand. It is changing the how in human cognition.  
It has been suggested that the possibility of the emergence of an altered human vulnerability is 
an argument against the idea that the, for human rights required, social consensus could be 
grounded in human vulnerability.289 As discussed in section 4.1, I suggest that the altered 
human vulnerability that emerges when viewing human cognition as entangled with the relevant 
kinds of AI does not pose a risk to the condition of a shared common set of human rights. I do 
rather, suggest that it can be possible to manage existential risks that can arise from 
technological advancements, with regards to the problem posed in this thesis, by 
acknowledging that there is a convergence of human cognition and AI. I, therefore, suggest that 
rethinking human rights in light of a posthuman understanding of how the relevant kinds of AI 
affect human cognition could help manage such risks. The altered common human vulnerability 
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does, however, require a flexible view of human rights in which the new altered common human 
vulnerability can provide a basis for rethinking recognized rights or recognition of new rights.  
As I have discussed in section 2.3, AI is affecting human cognition in ways that have not been 
possible before the introduction of AI. The evolved way of processing information is, in the 
contemporary context of artificial intelligence influencing human life, as discussed in section 
2.3, vulnerable to AI in personalization algorithms and augmented reality technology filtering 
information and to the possibility of revealing the content of cognition without the human’s 
consent. Since human cognition is, as presented in section 2.1, thought to have evolved as a 
way of controlling action and, thus, as a way of processing information, so that the human being 
can respond to what is perceived,290 protection of human cognition must be seen as necessary 
for humans to be agents. Protection of human cognition must, therefore, be seen as a common 
human interest that is vulnerable and necessary for humans to be agents. Since the protection 
of common human interests that are vulnerable and necessary for humans to be agents can be 
seen as common human interests that should be protected by human rights, I further suggest 
that the international human rights framework need to be rethought so that it can accommodate 
protection of human cognition in the contemporary context of artificial intelligence influencing 
human life. Rethinking of the protection of human cognition can also, as discussed in section 
4.2.1, be justified by the moral justifications equality and dignity. 
 
The international human rights framework could possibly be elastic enough to provide 
protection of human cognition in the contemporary context of AI influencing human life by 
rethinking of already recognized rights or by recognition of a new human right. 
As discussed in section 3.2, recognized rights that could be rethought to accommodate 
protection of human cognition as a common human interest that is vulnerable and necessary for 
humans to be agents is the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression. Other rights could only protect parts of human cognition 
and could thus not offer protection sufficient to protect human cognition in the contemporary 
context of AI influencing human life. As to rethinking these recognized rights so that they can 
accommodate protection of human cognition in the contemporary context of artificial 
intelligence influencing human life, I suggest, as discussed in section 4.3, that even though 
these recognized rights can, possibly, be interpreted to accommodate protection of parts of the 
 
290 See Glass, Arnold Lewis, Cognition, p. 2. 
 68 
human cognition in the contemporary context of AI influencing human life, I suggest that the 
wording of the rights imply that they cannot be interpreted so that they can accommodate the 
how in cognition, such as the freedom of how to think. When AI is affecting human cognition, 
it is affecting how human beings think, perceive, remember and understand, it is affecting the 
how in human cognition. I do, therefore, suggest that the international human rights framework 
cannot be seen as elastic enough to adapt already recognized rights to the contemporary context 
of AI influencing human life regarding protection of human cognition. 
As discussed in section 4.4.1, I suggest that protection of human cognitive liberty can be argued 
to pass justificatory tests, justifying new human rights. I do, therefore, suggest that the 
international human rights framework can be argued to be elastic enough for recognition of 
cognitive liberty as a new human right. Cognitive liberty is described as a fundamental right to 
use the full spectrum of the mind, the right concerns  the “ethics and legality of safeguarding 
one's own thought processes, and by necessity, one's electrochemical brain states”,291 and the 
concept is seen as multi-dimensional comprising the three recognized interrelated dimensions: 
 (i) the liberty to change one’s mind or to choose whether and by which means to change one’s mind; 
(ii) the protection of interventions into other minds to protect mental integrity, and (iii) the ethical 
and legal obligation to promoting cognitive liberty.292 
For a human being to be able to use the full spectrum of the mind it is necessary that the human 
is able to decide how to perform its mental processes. For a human being to be able to safeguard 
its own thought processes, and its electrochemical brain states, the human need to be able to 
protect how those processes are performed. For a human being to be able to change its mind or 
to choose whether and by which means to change its mind the human has to be able to decide 
how to change its mind. For a human to be protected from interventions into its mind it needs 
to be protected from interventions that change how its mental processes are performed. 
Cognitive liberty as a new human right could, therefore, be argued to accommodate protection 
of the how in human cognition. When AI is affecting human cognition, it is affecting how 
human beings think, perceive, remember and understand, it is affecting the how in human 
cognition.  Cognitive liberty as a new human right can, thus, be argued to accommodate 
protection of human cognition in the contemporary context of AI influencing human life. 
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My summarized conclusions are, based on these analyses, that the relevant kinds of AI affect 
human cognition in new ways that can be argued to alter common human vulnerability and that 
makes human cognition vulnerable. Since protection of human cognition as a common human 
interest that is vulnerable and necessary for humans to be agents can be argued to be a common 
human interest that should be protected by human rights, the introduction of AI entails a need 
for protection of human cognition in the contemporary context of artificial intelligence 
influencing human life. Since the already recognized rights cannot, in accordance with 
interpretative rules, be interpreted to accommodate protection of the how in human cognition, 
the international human rights framework cannot be seen as elastic enough to provide protection 
of human cognition in the contemporary context of artificial intelligence influencing human 
life, by rethinking of already recognized rights. However, protection of cognitive liberty can 
possibly be justified as a new human right, and the international human rights framework might, 
therefore, be elastic enough to provide protection of human cognition in the contemporary 
context of artificial intelligence influencing human life by recognition of a new human right. I, 
therefore, propose that a new human right guaranteeing protection of human cognitive liberty 










6.1 Artificial intelligence in personalization algorithms in scientific research 
I have, in the research for this thesis, used ways of collecting information where personalization 
algorithms have sorted information.293 This may to some extent have affected my thesis and the 
thesis must, therefore, be read with that in mind. I dare say that this is probably true as regards 
a large part of scientific studies in the contemporary context of AI influencing human life. I 
would therefore like to put forward that this is an important discussion to address. 
Scientific research is based on an idea of transparency and since personalization algorithms are 
often invisible or hard to understand it is important to take measures to make visible the 
personalization algorithms in such researches. As discussed in section 1.3 I have taken some 
measures to minimize or make visible the personalization. I suggest that such measures can be 
a possible way of handling personalization algorithms in scientific research since it can enable 
a possibility of understanding how personalization algorithms have affected the research. I, 
therefore, want to suggest that, in the scientific contemporary context of AI influencing human 
life, such measures are important to consider or to use to analyse gathered information. 
Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that personalization algorithms are present in the 
everyday life of human beings and do possibly affect a large part of a human being’s conception 
of the world. Since personalization algorithms affect me in my everyday life, and since it is 
inevitable that my conception of the world is visible in my thinking, personalization algorithms 
may not only affect my search results and gathering of material and information but also my 
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7. Closing reflection 
As a closing reflection, I want to point out that large technology companies seem to get 
increasing opportunities to collect data, about more and more aspects of human beings. Since 
data is used in AI that is affecting human cognition, this can possibly lead to AI affecting human 
cognition in more and more encompassing ways. To give an example, the news that Google has 
bought the company Fitbit was released during the writing of this thesis.294 Fitbit is a company 
that makes and sells fitness trackers and smartwatches.295 This company can, therefore, collect 
massive amounts of data about human beings. The purchase could, thus, increase, Google’s 
possibilities to collect different kinds of data about human beings. However, in an 
announcement, Google has stated that “Fitbit health and wellness data will not be used for 
Google ads”.296 Independent of this statement, this example implies increasing possibilities for 
big technology companies to deploy kinds of AI that are affecting human cognition. 
Since this could lead to AI affecting human cognition in more and more encompassing ways 
addressing the problem, of protection of human cognition in a time where AI is affecting human 
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